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Assembly Judiciary Committee 
Hearing on 
SANCTIONS AGAINST ATTORNEYS AND PARTIES 
September 18, 1987 
CHAIRMAN ELIHU HARRIS: This hearing is on the issue of 
sanctions against attorneys and parties. There's been a great 
deal of concern in the legal community, and I think in the public 
at large, about the whole system of justice, the administration 
of justice, and what makes it work; how we speed up the process; 
how we discipline lawyers and others for misconduct or for 
conduct that is not in the interest of justice. Sanctions are 
certainly one of those weapons that has been created to get a 
handle on misconduct. 
Several pieces of legislation have been introduced on 
the subject in the 1987-88 LegiElative Session, and those 
proposals are still pending. What we would like to do at this 
hearing is solicit comments on those pieces of legislation, and 
more importantly, the issue of sanctions against attorneys and 
parties. We want to make sure that any sanctions that are 
exercised are appropriate and that they are effective. 
So, in that regard, we would like to have comments and 
would like to ask our first witness, Mr. Howard Dickstein, who is 
with Kanter, Merin, Dickstein and Kirk of Sacramento and also 
General Counsel for the Little Hoover Commission, if you would 
come forward and give us some perspective on sanctions. 
Mr. Leslie, do you have any opening comments that you 
would like to make? Okay. 
MR. HOWARD DICKSTEIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good 
morning to you and to Mr. Leslie. J'm General Counsel for the 
Little Hoover Commission, and the Little Hoover Commission, of 
course, is the sponsor of AB 1252 introduced by Assemblyman 
Zeltner which is included in your packet. This bill was recently 
amended on September 11 to more accurately reflect the intent of 
the Commission, when it made a recommendation for attorney 
sanctions in its report on the insurance liability crisis in May 
of 1986. And, initially, you should be aware that the Commission 
did a study of the insurance liability crisis and the impact of 
the court system on that crisis. The only facts really before 
the Commission, and the only justification for any changes in the 
law, were based on preliminary research done in the course of 
that study. It is for that reason that the bill is limited to 
the tort actions: personal injury and wrongful death actions. 
It is not because the Commission feels that any other actions 
shouldn't be sanctioned, but it is simply a result of the fact 
that we didn't have any real knowledge one way or the other --
unlike this Committee -- on other kinds of actions. We felt that 
it would be inappropriate to make any recommendations outside the 
circle of study. 
Within the court system, certainly, there is evidence of 
abuse of the system. The fact alone, that 52 cents on every 
dollar paid out goes to attorneys, speaks for itself. It is 
interesting to note, in that regard, that it's not just the 
plaintiffs' attorneys or is it defendants' attorneys. Most 
of the issues the Commission looked at were contentious in that 
those interests that support the plaintiff were on one side, and 
those interests that support defendants on another. In this area 
-- and I think this is what sets it apart -- it impacts both 
sides. Because, certainly, in the testimony and research that 
the Commission conducted, it is clear that there are both 
frivolous claims filed and equally clear that frivolous motions 
and defenses were and are put forward by defense attorneys. 
Finally, the injured and their attorneys can make any 
kind of claim, and they can do so without any economic penalties 
because of the contingency fee system. And similarly, the 
defense attorneys have an interest in prolonging, perhaps 
delaying and making motions because of the kind of system they 
work within, which, as you know, is an hourly rate system -- the 
more hours an attorney puts in, the higher the attorneys fees. 
To the best of our knowledge, that 52 cents on the dollar we 
split very evenly. 
This is an area of concern to the Commission where 
(inaudible) and it is a difficult area to draw a line in. On the 
one hand, obviously, it's a matter of policy that use of the 
judicial system encourages a peaceful, orderly settlement of 
these suits. We discourage self-help. It is an adjunct, the 
mainstay of our system. There are constitutional underpinnings 
of the rights plaintiffs have to seek redress. There's 
constitutional underpinnings in the litigation as a form of 
speech. The professional responsibility of attorneys and to 
their clients is to pursue avenue, in fact every possible 
meritorious cause. It's not c to plaintiffs' attorneys in 
the first instance what may turn out to be meritorious and what 
may not turn out to be meritorious. It's the discove~J system, 
an elaborate and developed system, that the attorneys make 
that determination, so in some ways ff's attorney gets 
caught in the middle between obligations to the 
client and the ethical obl as an officer of the court to 
ensure that the courts time is not wasted. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, but let me interrupt one second. 
Is your opposition basically to the law as it's been amended 
regarding sanctions for these types of actions, or is it against 
its application? 
MR. DICKSTEIN: Well, I think the opposition to the law 
as it stands is that it has not operated as a deterrent. I think 
that AB 1252, as amended, would free up the sanctions from the 
monetary costs to the parties, which is unlike other bills that 
I'm aware of at least. The bill, as amended, very clearly would 
provide a penalty as well as the costs and attorney fees against 
the offending party, so that you have something like a civil 
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penalty and it would be something that the judge would have to 
exercise with discretion. I know, in discussions with the 
Judges' Association -- which opposed, and I think you can look in 
your packets for their letter of opposition on AB 1252 -- their 
reasoning was that we repealed existing CCP 128.5. Well, in its 
present form, it doesn't do that and it's never been the 
intention that it should do that. It would leave 128.5 just as 
it is but add, at least in the case of tort actions, a greater 
penalty and more discretion. We learned in our discussions with 
judges, at least at the trial court level, that it's rare, 
particularly in Sacramento County, for there ever to be a 
sanction of more than $1,000 or $1,500. So it was with that in 
mind that the bill comes in to give judges more discretion. 
It's my understanding, after talking to representatives 
of the Judges' Association about their opposition to the bill in 
its current form, that they would not oppose the bill in its 
current form. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Ms. DeBow, if you don't mind, could 
you give us a summary of the legislation in this area as well as 
the current status of either support or opposition? 
MS. DEBORAH DeBOW: Yes, to the extent that I know what 
the support or opposit1on is. There are currently three bills 
pending before our committee. Probably one or any of them will 
be heard in January. One of them is AB /45, by Mr. Harris. All 
it does is delete the "solely intended to cause delay" in 128.5. 
Then there is Assembly Bill 1252, Mr. Zeltner's bill which Mr. 
Dickstein is speaking to, which adds a special penalty in 
personal injury or wrongful death actions when a frivolous motion 
or a frivolous claim or defense is asserted, or a party causes 
unnecessary delay, and that penalty is up to $10,000. There is a 
third bill, AB 1914, which would enact Federal Rule 11 into 
California law, which requires that an attornP.y do reasonable 
inquiry and provide a certification when the attorney files a 
pleading with the court that it is well grounded in fact and 
lost. 
Now Senate Bill 379, by Mr. Presley, was passed last 
week, and it adopts Rule 11 for two counties in a pilot project 
in Riverside and San Bernardino, which is substantially similar 
to Assembly Bill 1914, Mr. Harris' bill adopting Rule 11. 
In 1985, there was Senate Bill 379, by Mr. Ellis, which 
recast 128.5 provisions. There has been some concern that, 
perhaps, in the recasting and nel., definitions that we opened up 
some problems in using 128.5 that, perhaps, we should look at and 
remedy. It is also pointed out there were major concerns that we 
didn't have time to address in 1985 and that we should be looking 
at over the next few years. So, that's another reason for having 
this hearing. The reason why we introduced Assembly Bill 245 is 
to open up the discussion and see if, perhaps, something else 
ought to be done. 
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The other bills that also address sanctions -- well not 
like 128.5 does -- is the Discovery Act for abuses in discovery, 
which went into effect July 1st, 1987, and then there's some 
belief that the pilot projects -- what is it? Assembly Bill 
3300? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, the Trial Court Delay Reduction 
Act. 
MS. DeBOW: Yes, that some other needs for sanctions 
under 128.5 may be reduced because of AB 3300. 
CHAIRMAN HA.RRIS: Thank you very much. All right, I 
want to recognize my colleagues, Tim Leslie, who's been here, and 
Mr. Friedman, who just joined us. Mr. Friedman, we have just 
begun by having testimony by Mr. Dickstein, who is General 
Counsel for the Little Hoover Commission, on the subject of Mr. 
Zeltner's bill relative to sanctions. And, Mr. Dickstein, I hope 
I didn't interrupt your train of thought with that interruption. 
But if you could continue, I think we have a background for the 
bills that are under consideration. 
MR. DICKSTEIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really have 
few opening remarks to make. I think this bill is pretty 
self-explanatory and I don't want to go on too much. I note that 
there are witnesses that are going to testify, that appear to 
have a depth and backgr6und in this area, and I'm anxious to hear 
from them. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: The Little Hoover Commission, 
basically, isolated and focused its concerns on that narrow issue 
MR. DICKSTEIN: This was one of eight or nine 
legislative recommendations, all of ch are making their way, 
successfully or unsuccessfully, through the Legislature. 
I would note only a more things: One, as Ms. 
DeBow indicated, the new Discovery Act have a pretty 
detailed sanction provision that we haven't really had an 
opportunity to see the impact of. There is CCP 2023, and a lot 
of care was taken in its drafting and I think it will be 
interesting for the Committee and Commission to note what its 
impact in operation is. It is limited to discovery abuses, and 
it defines discovery abuses in a fairly narrow way, so it 
certainly wouldn't apply to complaints or claims or summary 
judgment motions or certain kinds of defenses, but I think the 
fact that it does provide for a number of alternative types of 
sanction that don't exist at the present time may well be of 
interest, because it's not just monetary sanctions that are going 
to do the trick, but actual impact on the outcome of the 
litigation, the termination of it, or the admission of certain 
issues, or the evidentiary implications of frivolous motions. 
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Another point is that in Assembly Bill 1252, as it now 
stands, and as 128.5 also provides, there's a hearing. That, ~ 
think, is an important provision, -- certainly for the Commission 
in its study -- in striking an adequate balance between the 
rights of both attorneys to bring motions and claims, and also 
the rights of society in general and of the defendants not to be 
harassed. It's important, the Commission thought, to provide for 
a hearing so that these civil penalties, particularly when they 
can go up to ~10,000 in addition to the actual costs in 
attorney's fees, shouldn't be made or done lightly but that all 
the facts come out prior to the imposition of any such penalty. 
And there is a California Supreme Court case that appears to me 
to indicate that such a hearing is a necessary element prior to 
the imposition of a sanction. That case was for appellate 
sanctions. It didn't apply to trial court sanctions, but the 
reasoning, I would think, is equally applicable. 
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the 
Committee, AB 1252 in its present form attacks a specific 
problem, a problem the Commission had information about. It 
contains, we feel, adequate safeguards to protect the profession, 
and to the extent that it separates the penalty amount from the 
actual cost to the parties, its purpose is to provide a greater 
deterrent than any of the existing bills now in force to 
accomplish that objective. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Any questions? We have a 
couple of questions. Ms. DeBow would like to ... 
MS. DeBOW: In your personal role as an attorney, do you 
feel that there is any public policy reason to limit this $10,000 
sanction to personal injury or wrongful death actions? 
MR. DICKSTEIN: No. No, and it's my understanding that 
the Commission has no opposition to changes in the law outside of 
it; it's just that it had no knowledge on its own to support such 
legislation. It's as simple as that. 
MS. DeBOW: But in your personal experience .•. 
MR. DICKSTEIN: In my personal experience, I think that 
it is broader. I don't think there's any question in my mind. I 
have both experience as a defense attorney in litigation and I do 
plaintiffs' work -- about half and half. There's no question in 
my mind that the sanctions should apply to cases other than tort 
actions. In my experience, again -- in response to your question 
-- a lot of the so-called frivolous claims really come out of 
what I would consider ego battles among the attorneys (getting 
one up on each other or getting angry at each other or having 
personality conflicts that are being worked out through the 
courts) that have little or nothing -- and r think nothing is the 
more appropriate description -- to do with the merits of the case 
or the ultimate outcome of the case, as much as they do to the 
relationship between counsel. 
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Now, I find that when you have a good relationship with 
counsel and there's mature counsel, the problems are worked out 
in a more civilized way without involving the entire judicial 
system. But it's very difficult, I think, under present law, and 
the judges appear to me to be very -- it has to be a very extreme 
abuse the way the law is now written, before a judge will step 
in, and it's usually only after the second, third, or fourth time 
that that abuse occurs. 
In federal court, I find, again in my personal 
experience, that attorneys are a little bit less willing to go 
out and fight those kinds of battles before a federal judge, 
because a federal judge will be more likely, at least in the 
Eastern District in Sacramento, to sanction the attorney. The 
kinds of battles that occur in the superior and municipal courts 
are more likely to occur before the magistrates in federal court, 
which is another way of going that none of the bills address: to 
actually take discovery and put it at some other level so that it 
doesn't impact the court system as such. You have another kind 
of system that may be something that will be worthwhile looking 
into, the magistrates system and its application to the state 
courts. 
MS. DeBOW: Did you intend for this bill to apply to 
complaints and cross-complaints, also? 
MR. DICKSTEIN: Yes. 
MS. DeBOW: Okay. Now, the standards that you've set up 
in terms of defining frivolous motion, claim, or defense are 
slightly different than those already provided in 128.5. Do you 
have a reason for this? 
MR. DICKSTEIN: Well, I think the difference is really a 
similar difference to Mr. Harris' bill about "solely for the 
purpose of delay." I think that's the only significant 
difference that I can determine. It's almost impossible, I 
think, in my experience-- and the Commission's investigation 
bore this out -- to say that the sole cause of something is a 
delay. There's always some justification on some other level. 
But if the primary thrust of it is that it causes unnecessary 
delay, that, I think, implies that there was no other 
justification, no other real justification in terms of furthering 
the claim or furthering a defense to the claim or getting at 
information; so by eliminating that word, at least in the tort 
context, I think it makes a more realistic deterrent. 
MS. DeBOW: Okay. One of the standards under AB 1252 is 
that "it must have been made in bad faith, either for prolonging 
or delaying litigation, and to harass another party." The first 
test is a two-pronged test, and the second test is "without any 
reasonable basis in law or fact and lacking any good faith 
argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law." Was one concern to limit the chilling effect on a party or 
do you have another purpose? 
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MR. DICKSTEIN: No, no. There was really no other 
purpose in that. I understand the distinction you're making and 
I think that those things should be carefully looked at and 
drafted for consistency. At the same time, as a practical 
matter, you rarely if ever see a case where the purpose was delay 
that didn't have the impact of harassing the other party. 
They're really two sides of the same coin, and I can't really 
think offhand of an example of one without the other. One way of 
harassing a party is delaying the course of the litigation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN TIM LESLIE: As the non-attorney member of 
this panel, at least today, you can enlighten me on some things 
that everybody else in the room will already know about:. You 
indicated that sometimes personalities between counsels can give 
rise to some of the delaying tactics that would be involved in 
the legislation. Could you give me one hypothetical situation or 
scenario as to how this might arise and what kind of delaying 
tactic might be used? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: The one that you used. 
MR. DICKSTEIN: That was the first thing that came to 
mind, (laughter) but I was going to put it as, "A colleague of 
mine once did .•. " 
I guess what we'll sometimes see is where the attorneys 
really differ sharply on the merit of the case, and the defense 
attorney feels that the plaintiff is really a gold-digger and 
really has no business bringing the action, and the defense 
attorney has a good relationship with his or her client. The 
defense attorney will do things, probably, that would not 
otherwise be done. 
For example, I know of a situation in which the defense 
attorney came to know that the plaintiff was on an extended trip 
to Europe, and after a year and a half or so of litigation, the 
defense attorney decided that it was time to initiate a discovery 
device that would result in a psychiatric examination of the 
plaintiff which would require the plaintiff to come back within a 
certain period of time. Then the plaintiff's attorney would make 
motions for protective orders and the defense attorney would 
argue that it was absolutely necessary that the plaintiff be 
produced at a certain time for this psychiatric examination, and 
the relevance of the psychiatric examination was kind of 
tangential in the case. 
The case I'm thinking of was a sex harassment case. The 
director of an organization was accused of harassing a plaintiff. 
And the defense attorney wanted to see if the plaintiff was 
normal, what her background was like, whether she was unusually 
sensitive, and arguably that was relevant. At the same time, 
there were motions up and back and up and back as to when it was 
going to be scheduled and whether the person was going to have to 
come back from this trip, and whether the -- what we call the 
at-issue memo in which the lawyers agree that the case was ready 
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to be tried -- should be pulled because the plaintiff wasn't 
being made available for discovery. Then there was a motion to 
make it no longer at issue. And it just can go on and develop 
into tremendous struggles. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Given this scenario, then-- that's 
a good example. Thank you -- if AB 1252 were in fact law, how 
would it deal with this? It would take the judge to determine 
that there was frivolous activity going on and then he could 
impose a $10,000 fine? 
MR. DICKSTEIN: In addition to the costs. This is 
probably not an insurable item; this is not insured under a 
malpractice policy, for a number of reasons which I think other 
witnesses will address. But I think it would provide a real 
deterrent if it meant that the attorneys had to dig into their 
own pockets. Sometimes the costs are not that great. They're 
usually $1000 or less, so they're not that much of a deterrent, 
but if an attorney's going to have to dig into his own pocket for 
$8,000 or $9,000 plus the attorney's fees, I think he'd swallow 
before doing something like that. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask a question. Mr. Leslie's 
question is on point, although I think your answer is more 
responsive to the sanctions that are just limited to the 
Discovery Act reform. What about a trial? Why can't the judge, 
when he has got the party in court on the existing sanctions, 
exercise the appropriate disciplinary function to maintain 
control of the case and the process by which the case is being 
resolved? 
MR. DICKSTEIN: You say, "in court". Do you mean during 
the trial of the case? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, during the trial. 
MR. DICKSTEIN: I think the judge could but, first of 
all, very few of the cases ever get to trial, so you've already 
ruled out 98% of the cases. If you talk about sanctions during a 
trial, it's just going to apply to a few cases. Once you get 
into trial ••• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You don't see the problem of 
sanctions, basically, as being problems that visit the case at 
trial? 
MR. DICKSTEIN: No. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: But during discovery and during 
motions preceding the actual trial, settlement conferences and 
other kinds of things ... 
MR. DICKSTEIN: Once you are trial, particularly if 
there is a jury there, then the attorneys are going to be 
conscious about not wanting to come off as harassing and 
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delaying. The jurors have things to do, everyone has things to 
do. 
My experience, and the testimony of the Commission, was 
it was mostly in the bringing of the claim, the motions for 
summary judgment, the demurrers. Another good example is 
attorneys who were sued for malpractice almost always feel that 
the case is without merit against them. 
I've seen attorneys who won't report it to their carrier 
but want to defend themselves and will demurrer -- which is to 
make a motion to dismiss the case because it doesn't state a 
claim -- might lose it and then keep bringing other motions 
again, and again, and again, sometimes just because a certain 
portion of one cause of action wasn't clearly incorporated into 
another cause of action. Very technical reasons. 
Now that has nothing to do with discovery, and it 
wouldn't be covered by the new Discovery Act. But it would be 
covered by 1252 and by all the bills, really, that the Committee 
is considering. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Any other questions? Thank you 
very much. 
MR. DICKSTEIN: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I would like to next call Mr. Richard 
Fruin of Lawler, Felix & Hall, Los Angeles, who is the author of 
articles related to sanctions. Thank you. I appreciate your 
joining us. 
MR. RICHARD FRUIN: My name is Richard Fruin, F-R-U-I-N. 
By way of background, I graduated from law school at the 
University of California, Berkeley, in 1965. I've been with my 
present firm since that date. I do commercial litigation. I 
don't do any personal injury or wrongful death litigation. I 
represent both plaintiffs and defendants, both big and small 
plaintiffs and defendants. 
I have written several articles in obscure journals and 
Ms. DeBow found one of them, and I have been active in several 
bar association committees on sanctions. 
I would like to address just two problems, but perhaps 
before I do that, I could remark upon Mr. Dickstein's comments. 
I would agree with him that there is no problem with attorney 
abuse at trial. Once you are in front of the judge, the judge 
can control it and can understand what is going on. 
One of the reasons there is less 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: In your experience they do? 
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MR. FRUIN: Yes, they do. Sometimes you get weak judges 
that do not, but that's not common. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. 
MR. FRUIN: One of the reasons there is less litigation 
abuse in federal courts is because matters are assigned to a 
federal judge, a single judge at the filing window, and therefore 
the judge can supervise the calendar throughout the course of the 
litigation. That is not the practice in state court and, for 
that reason alone, you have more litigation abuse in state court. 
I disagree, I think, with Mr. Dickstein's view that 
providing the ability to obtain sanctions is going to lessen the 
friction that sometime occurs in lawsuits. The ability to seek 
sanctions is merely another weapon. It is a way to exacerbate 
rather than to minimize friction between counsel, because counsel 
can dig at each other by filing motions for sanctions. 
I have a whole list of situations in which fractious 
counsel cause problems for each other. To respond to your 
question, for instance: motions to disqualify opposing counsel~ 
arguments over the right to discovery or discovery of certain 
items; refusal to stipulate to matters that can be obtained as a 
matter of right if you make a motion to the court; making up 
motions without probable success either because you don't have a 
law or you don't have the facts; failure to comply with the 
litigation rules either because you don't understand the rules or 
because the rules are ambiguous, or because you didn't know about 
the rules. 
Litigation, these days, is very complex. You are 
litigating in many different courts: municipal and superior in 
different counties, federal appellate, arbitrations, 
administrative tribunals. Each of these courts has their own 
rules, and the rules are constantly changing. The most important 
rules are generally the unwritten rules, which is the custom and 
pract of that particular judge of that particular court. 
Let me turn to what I was to talk about ••• 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Before you do that -- the examples you 
raised. Talking about sanctions, those seem to be very difficult 
sometimes to pin down in terms of the intent of the moving party. 
It may be an error, but should we have sanctions where there is 
no mal-intent simply because of the fact that there was delay as 
a result of that action, -- by trying to disqualify the opposing 
counsel for example? Is that a legitimate tool in certain 
circumstances? Tell me a little bit about the sanctions as they 
might apply to those motions, whether they're made for frivolous 
purposes or otherwise. 
MR. FRUIN: Well let me say, at the outset, that I think 
intent to cause or actually causing delay is the wrong standard. 
In Los Angeles County, it takes five years to get to trial in the 
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superior court. Nothing that you do in the course of litigation 
is going to delay your day in court. 
The proper standard is unnecessary expense. Sometimes 
litigation becomes a war of attrition. I think that unnecessary 
delay is an irrelevant standard and that really you should be 
focusing upon unnecessary expense. It seems to me, if that were 
the standard it would clarify some of these problems. For 
instance, refusal to stipulate to matters that can be obtained as 
a matter of right. 
You can make the motion. Having to make the motion is 
not going to delay the proceeding at all. But the fact that the 
other side wouldn't stipulate has caused you unnecessary expense. 
Now, it wasn't frivolous, either, because the other side did not 
have to stipulate. There is no obligation that a party stipulate 
to things which you can get as a matter of right, but they should 
have done that. They should not have cluttered the court's 
calendar with a motion that should be granted. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: On that question, I assume that for 
every one of the various types of motions that can be made there 
has to be a reason that they are there and there must be times 
when they are appropriate. 
MR. FRUIN: Yes, that's right. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: How do you know, or how can you 
demonstrate or prove when it was appropriate and when it wasn't? 
MR. FRUIN: Well, I think an experienced litigation 
counsel would know when the motion, although ostensibly a 
discretionary motion, was a motion which the judge had no actual 
discretion to deny. 
There are many statutes which give courts' discretion. 
They have been on the books for many years. Many of the rulings 
of judges have been taken on appeal on those particular statutes 
and the appellate courts have defined the standard by which the 
court can deny or the standard by which a court, or under which a 
court, must grant such a motion. So that if you look in the 
annotations to the statute, you can determine in the clear cases 
what the result is going to be. Of course there are borderline 
cases too. That is why the statute is there. And if you have a 
good relationship with the other counsel normally you can work 
this matter out. But litigation, by definition, is adversarial; 
it's fractious. You know when you are playing football, when you 
are playing basketball, did anyone ever give you an elbow? Do 
they ever bump you? Do they ever trip you? All of those things 
are violations of rules, but it is done all the time. I think 
that litigation, since it has these rules which you must follow, 
provides innumerable opportunities for essentially bumping your 
opponent. That is why you try to develop a good relationship 
with the other attorney so that you keep your cost down. 
Sometimes the other attorney is not motivated to keep your cost 
down. 
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of time. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes, Mr 
litigation in the past 
st shooting above 7%. 
money by refusing to pay 
sue and then get to 
st were 15% and the 
when you were found 
%, 've more than covered 
during the interim period 
Mr. Fruin, what motivates 
your to protect innocent other 
parties from harassment and incurring unnecessary additional 
expenses or is it to try to protect the court from being weighted 
down in taking its time on matters are frivolous, 
compounding its problems with delay? 
MR. FRUIN: the source of my concern is that I 
hate waste. I reso disputes through litigation 
is extremely You must an extraordinarily wealthy 
country to do it the way we do I hate to see money wasted. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do 
might like to read 
MR. 
philosophy. 
origin. You 
don't like to 
should 
countervail cons 
des to panels 
parti You wou 
judges. have j 
inj j You would 
time we have a de di 
and civil law j 
an article on that? I 
on my 
But that's the 
family and I 
matters that 
the rules are. 
is more 
the system? 
But it's also 
s' time for 
thought, in 
giving further 
in our state 
think it's feasible 
the federal 
desirable. There are 
think it would be 
are specialists in 
who are personal injury 
commercial non-personal 
judges. At the present 
criminal law judges 
could develop 
judges who are specialists and experienced in particular areas of 
the law, that they could quickly evaluate a case and they could 
also better control a case. I think it might work in some 
counties that have a smaller case load and fewer lawyers and 
fewer claims. But I'm not sure it would work in Los Angeles. 
I'm not sure that I answered the question that you 
asked, Mr. Harris. Maybe I should go into what I was going to 
say. I haven't really done any recent research or considered my 
comments or prepared any papers at great length. I did want to 
talk about sanctions as a substitute for malicious prosecution. 
And then I want to talk about sanctions as an interference with 
the attorney-client relationship. 
First, let me say that 128.5, as it was originally 
drafted, I do not believe intended to authorize sanctions because 
a claim was made in bad faith. If you look in the legislative 
history, particularly the statement made by the legislative 
assistant to the Governor, it says that the statute that became 
128.5 was not intended to be a substitute for malicious 
prosecution. 
Malicious prosecution is a tort by which the winner in a 
civil law suit can file an action against the person who brought 
the action or maintained the defense and established that the 
claim was brought in bad faith with malice. It requires another 
lawsuit. However, there are some attributes of that second 
lawsuit which are not present when sanctions are used to censure 
and penalize for the filing of an action. To begin with, the 
defendant has a right to a jury trial, but you don't have the 
right to a jury trial when you have a sanctions hearing after the 
trial. The defendant has a right to discovery to see what the 
costs actually incurred by the plaintiff were, but you don't have 
that right when you have a sanctions hearing on a motion. 
The defendant, if a client in a malicious prosecution 
action, has a defense that he or she has relied upon advice of 
counsel after making full disclosure of the facts, and that is a 
defense against malicious prosecution, but that's the very 
subject which can give rise to sanctions in a sanctions hearing. 
If you've finished a trial and you've lost, and the 
other side hits you with a sanctions motion, you are in a very 
difficult position both professionally and morally. You may have 
lost the trial, but your client might want to take an appeal. 
Yet the attorney and your opponent, your adversary, is now 
seeking to impose sanctions upon both you as counsel for the 
client and the client. Now there are various things that can be 
said, obviously, in your and your client's defense. However, you 
are the attorney for the client. You are the shaper and the 
presenter of the client's story. Now if the assertion is that 
the claim should not have been filed, what should the lawyer do. 
Should the lawyer say, "I didn't think it should be filed either 
but my client wanted me to file it," or "I didn't think it was a 
valid defense but I told my client they had a 10% chance of 
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prevail on s fense," or "I told him, 'I don't think you 
have a defense at all hut you have a right to make the plaintiff 
prove .'"Can the lawyer say that about the client in order to 
remove ibility that the lawyer himself is going to be 
ject to sanct ? 
He can't do that. He has to tell his client, 
"You go yourself another lawyer who will represent you at 
this sanctions hearing because I am now an adversary to you." 
And the client may say, "I want you to take an appeal. You know 
the case. You know the rights and wrongs of it. How can I hire 
a lawyer to represent me against you at the same time I want to 
hire you to take an appeal?" I think it's an insoluble problem, 
and I don't think any of the bills that you have address it. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well if it is insoluble then probably 
you don't want to try it. 
MR. FRUIN: Bu~ i~ is permitted. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Now I see what you're saying. 
MR. FRUIN: You created a problem. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I understand. Now, I see what you're 
saying. I'm sorry. I misunderstood. I've got it. 
MR. FRUIN: 128.5, as it was amended, has created that 
problem. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Does ~his happen now? 
MR FRUIN: Yes, it does. 
E s 
MR. FRUIN 
So s with or without any 
new bill 
MR. FRUIN: 1, the r to seek sanctions, that is 
the statutory , has created lem. If you didn't have 
that statute remedy of prevailing party at trial 
would malicious prosecution. Indeed, 
you s problem, 's greatly minimized because they 
have to sion that they are going to instigate 
another litigation. They probably wouldn't do it while the first 
litigat is on appeal if it is still on appeal. But, after 
you've prevailed at the trial, it is very easy for the prevailing 
counsel to move in with a sanctions motion and say, "Judge, you 
have already decided this case. You know that they don't have 
any real merit in this claim. You've decided so yourself." And 
that's another problem that this statute creates; and that is ... 
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ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Excuse me, before we get to that 
I just have a point on your last comment, Mr. Fruin. Couldn't 
the same dilemma be provoked by an action for malicious 
prosecution following trial? 
MR. FRUIN: 
occur immediately. 
Yes, it could be, but it's not going to 
The day after trial •.. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Well, the action could be filed 
immediately and the dilemma for the party's discovery could begin 
very soon thereafter, and motion for summary judgment could be 
made quite soon. That could be heard in virtually the same time 
period as the sanctions hearing. 
MR. FRUIN: No, I don't believe that is true. To begin 
with, you can't hear a motion within 45 days from the filing and 
service of the complaint and ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Is it 60 or is it 90? I'm not 
sure. It's not that much different, even if it isn't exactly the 
same. 
MR. FRUIN: Well, what I am saying is there are a number 
of procedural protections that would prevent the immediate 
hearing on a malicious prosecution action of the summary 
judgment. But, you know, deciding to go forward with the 
malicious prosecution action is a decision in itself. Client and 
lawyer have to get together on it~ it's going to cost more money. 
Once the action is filed you have procedural protections and then 
the moving, that is the resisting, party could always seek a 
delay which will probably be granted if the matter is still up on 
appeal. 
As a matter of fact, I'm not sure that you can file a 
malicious prosecution action. You have to have a favorable 
determination, and I don't know whether the trial court decision 
is a favorable determination if you still have the right to 
appeal. But, I don't want to unduly take your time. I've 
prepared an outline for a talk which I gave -- actually it was a 
number of particular episodes that could occur -- and there's a 
recorded California case called Lesser vs. Huntington Harbor 
Corporation, in which a sanctions hearing proceeded immediately 
after trial and the judge said at trial, "I don't think this case 
had any merit. Come back tomorrow and I'll determine how much 
I'm going to impose sanctions on the losing party." I mean, you 
are hit with a thunderbolt at a point in time when the relations 
between you and your client are very critical. 
While I'm still on the subject of malicious prosecution, 
there are some problems with all these bills. Section (d) of 
128.5 says "The liability imposed by this section is in addition 
to any other liability imposed by law, or act or omissions within 
the purview of this section." 
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The question ses, if the prevailing party does obtain 
sanctions against the losing party, is that it? Or does the 
prevailing party have a right, in addition, to sue for malicious 
And if the prevailing party in addition to getting 
sanctions sues for malicious prosecution, is the determination of 
the judge at the sanctions hearing collateral estoppel so that 
the losing party has no defense in a malicious prosecution 
proceeding? 
In a malicious prosecution proceeding the plaintiff 
says, "One judge has already decided that this claim had no 
merit, was frivolous, was done for the purpose of delay, and now 
I want you simply to rubber stamp that decision." 
You have another question. What if you're hit with a 
sanction and it is $10,000, and you pay $10,000, and then the 
prevailing party sues you for malicious prosecution? Do you get 
an offset for the $10,000 that you paid? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: In that regard, do you think there 
should be a choice of one or the other or do you feel that both 
are appropriate? 
MF. FRUIN: Yes, yes, there should be a choice. As a 
matter of fact there is a statute -- I don't have it in mind 
right now, but it was adopted before 128.5 -- that says, when you 
sue a governmental entity and you lose, and it's determined that 
the action was filed in bad faith or was frivolous or something 
like that, you can seek sanctions but that is determinative of 
your right to sue for malicious prosecution. 
that 
after 
that 
tr 
always 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You elect one or the other? 
MR. FRUIN: You elect one or the other. But I think 
b st problem is the that the sanctions motion 
1 drives between the attorney and his client. However, 
occurs not only if a sanctions motion is brought to 
ly anytime a sanctions motion is brought. It's 
ing away at the attorney-cl relationship because 
the lawyer 
by saying, 
is always tempted to explain away his responsibility 
"It was my client's decision to bring this matter." 
In Great Britain, the barristers follow what is known as 
the "cab rule" -- I think it's called the "cab rule" -- which 
means to say that any barrister is for hire; that the worst 
person, the scummiest person in Great Britain, can go to the best 
barrister and if he can pay his fees, he can hire that barrister. 
The barrister is there as a public utility. 
Well, you know, we have vestiges of the British system 
and it pops up in odd ways throughout our litigation system. But 
at least that's an ideal, that anyone can go to a good lawyer and 
if they can persuade the lawyer that they have a case, they can 
get that lawyer to represent them. 
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But this right of sanctions, you see, is making the 
lawyer personally responsible for the sort of investigation that 
the lawyer has done in trying to find out whether the client has 
a good case or not. You have professional questions like, 
"should you advise your client in writing that should this motion 
be brought, that there is a possibility of sanctions?" If you 
have to advise your client in writing, it's a substantial 
additional expense. 
Sanctions can be used to make the other side jittery. 
As an example, for instance, I have an associate who is appearing 
on a demurrer today in the Santa Monica Court. He filed this 
demurrer in July, but in the Santa Monica Court you have to get a 
reservation in order to have a hearing. So the hearing was 
today, although this was filed some two months ago. 
The opposition need not be filed until five days before 
the hearing. So the opposition was filed and mailed on Monday, 
or we received it on Monday, I forget which. But the opposition 
asked for sanctions for a hearing set this Friday. And why did 
they ask for sanctions? Well there were a variety of reasons. 
One reason was that the demurrer wasn't set for hearing within 30 
days, which is required by the statute. 
The Santa Monica court won't hear any demurrer within 30 
days. And there were a number of other little things like that. 
They said that the demurrer was not set out in a separate piece 
of paper. Well, we got the opposition on Monday, and it sought 
sanctions for a hearing on Friday. You have to file any reply 
two days before the hearing, so the reply had to be filed on 
Wednesday. 
Then it asked for sanctions. Well sanctions were 
inappropriate, but what do you do? 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Are you familiar, Mr. Fruin, with 
sanctions on sanctions motion? It would seem that your 
description and my experience bears out that often times 
sanctions are used as part of one party's strategy to do all the 
things that sanctions motions are intended to minimize. How 
frequently does it occur that a party and counsel in the position 
of your associate today would respond by seeking sanctions for 
the opposing party's attempt to get sanctions against you so 
late? 
MR. FRUIN: Well, in this particular episode it is not 
possible. You have due process requirements for the hearing of a 
sanctions motion. The present law and the present bill say that 
a sanctions motion may be contained in a party's responding 
papers. So, this sanctions motion was properly included in the 
responding motions, despite the fact that the responding motions 
were received five days before the hearing. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: I guess what I'm saying is, 
there's two bases for seeking sanctions on sanctions: you could 
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MR FRUIN: 
cost of 
You're going to lose it 
sanct motion into 
of the merits of the matter 
are concerned about the sanctions 
motion which the 1 a 
it's not the merits of the matter 
for sanctions. 
Then, the 
that you have to wonder how 
can decide the merits of 
whether or not the mot is 
outline I ... 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: 
make that j 
to witness ? 
MR. FRUIN 
to comply 
or the mer 
judge perhaps could 
sanctions for 
lat , 1 
It's to 
However 
deficiency 
s you too little time to 
ous, it's meant to harass, or 
to as a basis for sanction 
could be said 
, I wouldn't bring it 
than you're going to get. 
you start entangling a 
matter, you run the risk 
overlooked because the parties 
That's the part of the 
financial interest: 
rise to the claim 
, another problem is 
judge can be such that he 
independently decide 
brought, and in this 
be the best person to 
would have the chance 
however judges have 
a heavy calendar. 
s are very 
should not be 
going to impose 
is the best person to 
may have their 
summary I have 
way of solution. 
I think that 
"process" sanctions, and 
sanctions. The 
a process failure. You 
the person who filed 
s, or some other 
responsibility of the 
nothing to do with the 
's position. I think that a 
to routinely impose 
be like a traffic 
to get your attention. 
for a substantive 
s rise to other 
considerations, such as the attorney-client relationship, more 
substantive due process, that sort of thing. So I think you 
might make a distinction between those two areas in your 
thinking. 
Secondly, I would suggest that maybe a sanctions motion 
should be separately noticed, rather than being tacked on to the 
main motion or being tacked on to the opposition. That would 
lessen the likelihood that it's going to be routinely thrown on 
and is going to make a cleaner record with respect to the 
responsibility of the parties in making a sanctions motion. 
Also, it would limit the possibility that the merits of the 
motion are going to become entangled with the personalities and 
the conduct of the clients and the attorneys before the judge. 
I have nothing further to say. It's a very interesting 
topic, and in many aspects of it the literature is inadequate in 
describing the actual problems with the sanctions movement. I 
would say that, you know, in Great Britain and British 
Commonwealth countries, the loser pays the costs of the winner. 
And, in many ways, sanctions are kind of an evolutionary 
development in American law moving in that direction. Because, 
in actual practice, this standard of frivolousness or bad faith 
gets watered down a great deal, particularly if it's a motion 
which is filed just after the conclusion of a trial. You don't 
have time to tell the court whether or not you have good faith or 
bad faith, or what the frivolousness of the claim or the defense 
was. So that gets blurred. The judge says, "You lost. You were 
wrong. You pay sanctions." And sanctions become a way of 
fee-shifting. It's consistent with the fact that more and more 
statutes which are passed now at both the state and federal level 
have fee shifting provisions in them. And I don't think that the 
standards that you have put in the proposed statutes or in the 
present statute, really in practice are much of a barrier to the 
imposition of sanctions when a judge really wants to impose them. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you, Mr. Fruin. You were very 
helpful and insightful. This is an important topic. We have a 
lot of pressure on us, as you are aware, both in the area of 
disciplining lawyers for misconduct and for not being 
professional in their demeanor. There is also a lot of pressure 
on us because of the five-year average trial time it takes to 
resolve a matter in Los Angeles. Sanctions are one of the tools 
available and we want to make sure it is used appropriately. The 
complexities, I think, of sanctions and malicious prosecution, 
and the side issues that emerge therefrom, are very important and 
you pointed them out to us. In trying to draft some legislation, 
I think, we'll be a little more creative as well as a little more 
conscious of the complexities in this area. 
ASSEMBLYMAN I"ESLIE: At this point, I have a question. 
The conflict that can be created between the attorney and the 
client, when it gets down to, not the process kind of things but 
the substantive kinds of issues, I guess the attorney could 
always argue that the client had to make the decision because I 
- 19 -
cl 
MR. FRUIN: I 
almost a 
to tell 
, the buck would 
client theoretically in 
the situations I've 
you're almost 
in this -- that 
's advice and 
I think that most 
must rely totally 
have a good case or a 
ASSEMBLYMAN JJESLIE: So it's a 22, in terms of 
that one of 
defend himself against sanct 
explained to my client ... " 
re 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You're 
lity? 
ASSEMBLYMAN 
decis I to h 
1." But on 
went ahead 
out 
you 
granted, 
yourself. 
challenged 
someone 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: 
motions 
the 1 igation process 
available to be 
standpoint. In 
use every 
get away 
I mean the attorney's trying to 
He can always say, "Well, I 
about tracing down 
client made a bad 
chance. He made the 
to know that if they 
encouraging it. 
that 
ss, and in the 
And if you make that 
sk that sanctions are 
ther lawyer or 
s, it's true that 
s a problem. Every 
sanctions may be 
there were 99 times 
all of the 
it's your fault, 
client, whether 
through the file 
law to see how 
sanctions were not 
in order to defend 
is being questioned and 
like very much and 
ssional. 
, my difficulty is that 
available to counsel in 
nature are 
other side's 
al process and you 
reality, that if you 
think about it next 
time there's a play run, so sometimes you do that. So, 
obviously, we want to make sure that we understand that sometimes 
those things serve, if not appropriate purposes, certainly the 
purposes of those people that are utilizing those tools. Maybe 
we want to make sure that if they use them they don't get caught 
when they're using them in an inappropriate way, because there's 
going to be a penalty. But that's all we can do. 
MR. FRUIN: That's true. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. 
Okay. I'd like to next ask Ms. Lynne Yates-Carter, who 
is the Legislative Chair of the Executive Committee of the Family 
Law Section of the State Bar of California to come forward. How 
are you today? 
MS. LYNNE YATES-CARTER: The Family Law Section has 
reviewed the Assembly Bills that are before you today. I think 
you have in front of you our position paper on one of the bills 
that we had a great of concern about, which was AB 1252. 
Attorneys' fees, costs, and .•. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Your letter on that bill doesn't 
relate to the bill as it is now before us, I don't think. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: The bill's been amended. I don't know 
if you were here. 
MS. CARTER: That's right. It was my understanding that 
it was being amended on that date. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Does that change your position on 
that bill? 
MS. CARTER: As far as our concerns on the bill, and if 
you let me grab that bill very quickly, the AB 1252 copy ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Yes, all the points in your letter, 
which were well taken, aren't relevant. So you'll either be 
needing to come up with some new points or I guess we'll need 
your opposition or, of course, you can do whatever you want. 
MS. CARTER: Okay. If the sanctions that are imposable 
in an action generally are limited to $10,000, we would have an 
ongoing objection because we have an ongoing concern where the 
ever-increasing cost of family law litigation is often 
exacerbated by the opposition between the parties and the desires 
of the parties (the emotional questions that come into family law 
situations) that increase the amount of costs overall. As 
presently drafted, AB 1252 does talk about sanctions, a 
legislative intent to limit the sanctions in personal injury and 
death cases to a cap of $10,000. If that is the only cap, then 
we wouldn't be as concerned about the impact on family law and 
the cap that might be raised on the family law action. 
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What we still have an ongoing concern about is the 
standard that's being used in drafting the legislation on the 
imposition of attorneys' fees and costs and where there is a 
delineation between the motive, and I'm looking at Section 3 in 
the amended version of 1252, talking about what a frivolous 
motion claim or defense is, either for the purposes of prolonging 
or delaying the resolution of a litigation and to harass the 
other party. I think we'd have an ongoing concern with that 
language, because we see that as being an "or" proposition. In 
family law, very often you have a party who may want to prolong 
the case. They may want to harass the case, and the tactics they 
use may have either effect. We want to leave the general ability 
of the court to impose sanctions as open as possible. 
I don't know if the Committee's aware of the use of 
attorneys' fees, costs, and sanctions in family law. Generally, 
at the present time, I'd like to address that very briefly. In 
many counties, including the county that I practice in -- Santa 
Clara County -- the family law filings in superior court 
presently constitute 40% of the total filings. We have local 
rules. We have special guidelines that cover the area of 
attorneys' fees, costs, and sanctions, and even with that we've 
always looked at CCP 128.5 as being a very valuable tool in an 
attorney's arsenal to try to stop nonrneritorious litigation and 
abuses of the process. 
One issue that has come up in the past is whether or not 
there ought to be any limitations on a party's ability to get 
attorneys' fees, costs, and sanctions under 128.5 and whether or 
not the recent revisions in the Discovery Act would eliminate the 
value of 128.5. We still see that as being a backup and needed 
piece of legislation to help us meet the often very ski~.lful 
tactics employed in family law actions to delay the litigation, 
to increase the cost of litigation, and to try to force one party 
out of being able to fund ongoing litigation in family law, which 
results in a very serious loss of personal rights. We would urge 
you, in considering this question, to leave as open as possible 
the availability of sanctions, attorneys' fees, and costs, 
especially keeping them open in family law actions. 
I'd be glad to answer any questions that the committee 
might have specifically. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Talk to me very briefly, if you would, 
about the $10,000 limit that you object to as an inappropriate 
level. 
MS. CARTER: Absolutely. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I'm not sure I quite understand. I 
know that it's a lot of money. Is that the only reason? One of 
the traditional attitudes is if the punishment measures up to the 
crime or the misdeed, then why is $10,000 or could not $10,000 be 
appropriate if it is discretionary with the judge? Look at the 
particular case, look at the amount of delay, look at the 
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particular cost, look at how egregious it was. Might it not be 
worth $10,000? What if it was a Joan Collins' divorce? There's 
plenty of money involved, and this guy makes these comments that 
turn out to be totally in error. He made some assertions, made 
some motions, and the motions were made on these assertions, and 
we found out that it was all fantasy, and caused her a lot of 
embarrassment, caused a lot of problems, caused a lot of delays, 
and held her up to more ridicule in those magazine pulp pieces. 
Tell me about it. Might not just $10,000 be appropriate? 
MS. CARTER: We're saying $10,000 may not be enough. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Right. 
MS. CARTER: Unfortunately, in many civil cases there 
can't be a finite end to the litigation. One of the common 
tenets of family law attorneys is if there are children and if 
there is support being paid, that litigation isn't going to end 
until the support terminates or until the children are age 18, or 
possibly beyond depending upon what happens with pending 
legislation. The problem is that the in-court battles can extend 
over a period of years. During those in-court battles, because 
of delays on the civil calendar, because of the lesser 
availability of courtrooms for family law cases -- somehow a 
family law case with $200,000 in assets is seen as less serious 
than a P.I. case involving $75,000 in a demand -- because of 
those problems we have extended family law litigation, with 
ever-increasing costs of that family law litigation, and if you 
put a $10,000 cap on it that's not enough. That's not enough to 
compensate for the nonmeritorious motions that may be brought in 
the intervening years. 
We're saying no cap, absolutely no cap. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Oh, I see. Now I understand. I 
thought you were saying that $10,000 was too much. 
MS. CARTER: Oh, no. By no means. I have a case 
pending now where my fees are close to $80,000. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: What is the sanction fee based upon 
today? 
MS. CARTER: Attorneys' fees and costs. Some counties 
have adopted local rules as well that impose for specific 
sanctions being assessed for violation of local rules as a 
policy. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: If today it's attorneys' fees and 
costs, and this bill makes it attorneys' fees, costs, plus --
don't you think that this bill makes progress then? You're 
opposing it because it doesn't go far enough, but it's taking a 
step that's never been taken before. 
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MS. CARTER: In the initial draft we did oppose it 
because it didn't go far enough and because it set a specific 
cap, and we opposed the specific cap because we thought it wasn't 
enough. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: So, what amount do you think it 
should be increased to? 
MS. CARTER: Whatever amount the court deems appropriate 
under the circumstances. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: In other words, you'd say court 
costs, expenses, and penalties as determined by the court? 
MS. CARTER: Attorneys' fees, costs, and appropriate 
sanctions -- I'm not trying to draft the legislation -- various 
elements would include attorneys' fees, costs, and also provide 
the court with the opportunity to award sanctions. Now, again, I 
can't speak for the Committee on the amended bill because we 
didn't even consider the amended bill, but we will be addressing 
that issue, I'm sure. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: But from what I can gather now, the 
only problem that you have with the bill -- or one of the 
problems you have with the bill -- is that it just doesn't go far 
enough, and you'd like to see the cap off and leave it totally to 
the discretion of the judge in terms of the sanction amount. 
MS. CARTER: That's right, again because ••. , I'm not 
saying every case in family law is a marathon, by any means. But 
we do have cases where one side, at the very outset of the 
litigation, is determined to "get" the other side. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Would you rather have no bill, or 
would you rather have a bill that provided for $10,000? I mean, 
if it came down to that. 
MS. CARTER: If I had my "druthers" -- and I speak as an 
individual and not for the Committee, because I can't speak for 
the Committee on this -- I would like to have a bill that 
expressly makes sanctions, over and above reasonable attorneys' 
fees or attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses actually incurred, 
available. Under this process I would like to see, individually, 
the legislation drafted to incorporate the possibility of getting 
it not only for tactics that are harassment, but also as a 
separate issue those that cause unnecessary delay. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Well, I think I agree with you, but 
I just was wondering, if it carne down to a point of negotiation 
and you had to decide if there was going to be no sanction 
amounts, as is the current practice, or there was going to be a 
cap put into the law, would you rather have none or would you 
rather have it with a cap? 
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MS. CARTER: I think that I'd rather have a cap, if I 
had to choose between the two, but my preference by far is having 
an open-ended amount for those very egregious cases. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: All right. Any questions? Thank you 
very much. We appreciate it very much. Are there any other 
witnesses? Anyone else who has heard the testimony who would 
like to make a comment on the question of sanctions? I think 
we've gotten, at least from my perspective, some varying 
viewpoints on the question that are going to help us formulate 
either one or a number of pieces of legislation on the question, 
because we are obviously looking for tools to expedite the trial 
process and the civil litigation process in general. I think the 
ideas that have been elicited and the comments that have been 
made are going to help us to draft appropriate parameters in this 
area. 
I don't have any other questions. Is there anything 
else, Ms. DeBow? 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Could we have just a moment for a 
little internal discussion? I assume that what we've been 
talking about this morning would come under the category, 
generally, of tort reform? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, not really. Perhaps litigation 
reform or trial delay reform. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: One of our witnesses was talking 
about this as being a tort reform kind of thing. 
MS. DeBOW: Specifically, what he was addressing was 
what they did their study on and what the final results were. He 
was with the Little Hoover Commission, right? 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Right. They were concerned about 
this as it related to tort reform. 
MS. DeBOW: As it related to personal injury and 
wrongful death. 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Well, you know what I'm kind of 
wondering about is that last Friday, we had quite a discussion 
about ••. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: It was on the table in terms of .•• 
ASSEMBLYMAN LESLIE: Yes, and you know, if someone would 
consider this tort reform, would we have to postpone this hearing 
for five years? 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We don't have to postpone it. The 
trial lawyers and the insurance industry and the manufacturers 
and doctors and 90% of the people of California would not care 
about it. No, I don't think it would specifically fall under 
that at all. I think it is much more about the process. 
- ?.5 -
Mr. Friedman, do you have any more to add? 
ASSEMBLY~~N FRIEDMAN: A point that didn't come up that 
aware of is use and abuse of 
prosecut by parties who are 
various public interest entities, especially 
st board was performed by pro bono •.. 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You have some experience in that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIEDMAN: Yes, I do. In fact, just 
yesterday, I was talking to people in my L.A. office who had 
involved some pro bono counsel from a major Los Angeles law firm. 
It was a terribly egregious case. It was in the paper this week. 
It was an eviction of a woman. It seems that the party in that 
case, who was trying to evict her -- the landlord -- is infamous. 
When he is involved in litigation with pro bono counsel on the 
other side, he invariably brings sanctions actions against them 
or malicious prosecution actions if they try to block whatever 
he's trying to do that's typically illegal. And that 
intimidates, and sometimes successfully, pro bono counsel because 
in the major law firms it creates such enormous malpractice 
premiums that the simple threat of being sued for malicious 
prosecution or sanctions chills their participation. And the 
fact that it could be filed would increase their premiums by tens 
of thousands of dollars just because they're involved in a case. 
A lot of these matters involve creating new law, trying to find 
new ways to protect innocent victims. I don't necessarily see 
that this is directly on 
though? 
to 
that it's 
remedy 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What about your sanctions point, 
it's a reasonable fear. 
, but the professional 
well as use malicious 
counsel from acting or 
unrepresented. 
, looked at the 
ling or 
Mr. Friedman 
whether or not they've been 
addressing those kinds of 
MS. DeBOW: No comments today and having 
s area who have mentioned 
It's a procedural problem. It does not 
insurance premium problem. 
a r of 
a problem. 
malpract 
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I think we ought to address that 
problem because, obvious , sanctions can be misused. Okay. 
Any other matter to come before the committee? 
Thank you. 
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The Honorable Elihu M. Harris 
Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
California Legislature 
State Capitol 
P. 0. Box 942849 
Sacramento, California 94249-0001 
Dear Chairman Harris: 
ORANGE COUNTY OF"F'"ICE: 
SUITE 1650 
C595 TOWN CENTER DRIVE 
COSTA MESA. CALI,.ORNIA 92526 
(71 .. ) 8!10·1310 
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the 
Committee on September 18, 1987 to comment on the bills currently 
under consideration to amend Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5. 
This letter will summarize my specific suggestions to the Committee 
to clarify Section 128.5. 
1. Sanctions As A Substitution For Malicious Prosecution. 
Under present wording, Section 128.5 may be employed to 
impose sanctions on a party, his counsel or both at the trial 
court conclusion if the claim, or presumably the defense, is 
deemed to be in bad faith and pursued frivolously or to cause 
unnecessary delay. Section 128.5 in this usage is a substitute 
for an independent action for malicious prosecution, however, the 
inter-relationship between Section 128.5 and malicious prosecution 
is not addressed by the statute. Left open by the statute and 
case law are the issues of whether a litigant may proceed both 
with a claim under Section 128.5 and a malicious prosecution 
action; whether a determination on the 128.5 motion is collateral 
estoppel with respect to a subsequent malicious prosecution 
action; and whether any award paid as a sanction is an offset 
against a subsequent successful malicious prosecution judgment. 
At the hearing, Chairman Harris suggested that perhaps a 
litigant should be allowed to pursue either a sanctions award 
• under Section 128.5 or malicious prosecution action but not both. 
That approach, in which I would concur, is already embodied in 
Code of Civil Procedure Section 1038. (Section 1038 was adopted 
in 1980, one year before the original Section 128.5.) Section 
1038 applies to actions filed against the State or its political 
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subdivisions and provides that if the action is concluded in the 
State's favor by summary judgment or nonsuit, the State may make 
application for an award of its legal fees by showing that the 
action was brought without "reasonable cause" and without a "good 
faith belief that there was a justiciable controversy under the 
facts and law ... " Section 1038(c) specifically provides as 
follows: 
" . . and any party requesting the relief pursuant to 
this section waives any right to seek damages for 
malicious prosecution. Failure to make such motion shall 
not be deemed a waiver of the right to pursue a malicious 
prosecution action." 
I would urge that Section 128.5 be amended consistently with 
Section 1038, to preclude a party who moves for sanctions under 
Section 128.5 for his opponent's bringing of the action from 
subsequently seeking recovery for the tort of malicious 
prosecution on the same matter. 
2. The Entanglement Of Sanctions With The Merits Of The 
Motion. 
Our discussion at the hearing also covered the fact that 
an application for sanctions filed in a pre-trial proceeding may 
divert attention away from the merits of the motion and cause the 
attorney resisting such an application to spend time to the 
detriment the presentation on the merits of the motion. This 
is cularly so because Section 128.5(b)(l) as presently 
written s that an application for sanctions may be noticed 
"in a 's or responding The section appears 
to contemplate that ication for sanctions may be an 
"add-on" to a motion or opposition to a motion, and, in 
actual practice, most sanction applications are an "add-on" to 
the motion or the opposition. The coupling of a substanti.ve 
motion with an application for sanctions makes the opposing party 
~not only defend on the merits but also defend his motives with 
the risk that merits and motives may become entangled. The 
filing of sanctions application, as I expressed at the hearing, 
. also raises the specter of a conflict between the attorney and 
his or her client just at the time when the attorney is attempting 
to present the client's position. 
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I would suggest that Section 128.5 be amended to provide \ 
that any application for sanctions must be noticed as a separate 
motion and must be accompanied and supported by a statement of · 
proposed findings justifying the requested sanctions. The 
requirement of a separate motion, to my mind, will reduce the 
number of frivolous sanctions applications filed and by requiring 
the enumeration of the alleged grounds for the imposition of 
sanctions will ~eparate the merits of the pending motion from the 
attempt to censure counsel and/or client by imposing sanctions. 
Such a rule will also prevent the "add-on" of a sanctions 
application to a motion opposition, a practice which may not give 
the opposing party adequate opportunity to prepare and present a 
rebuttal to the Section 128.5 claim. California Rules of Court 
317(a) provides that any opposition to a motion shall be filed 
not later than five days before the noticed hearing, and any 
reply not later than two days before. If a sanctions application 
is first noticed in an opposition then the party addressed by 
that application may not have sufficient time to present an 
adequate rebuttal. The rebuttal, furthermore, necessarily will 
be embedded in the reply memorandum submitted on the substantive 
motion. 
Thank you again for the invitation to appear before the 
Committee. 
?irul~ Richar~L. Fruin, Jr. 
RLF:mg 
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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90012 
CHAMBERS OF 
NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, JUDGE 
September 9, 1987 
Honorable Elihu M. Harris 
Chairman, California Legislature 
Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
State Capitol 
P. 0. Box 942849 
Sacramento, California 94249-0001 
Dear Assemblyman Harris: 
Tnank you for inviting my review and response to 
the AB 493, AB 1252 and AB 1914 regarding sanctions for 
bad faith and frivolous actions and tactics. 1 respond, 
of course, only for myself; 1 do not speak for the 
Superior Court or any of its committees, nor of the Los 
Angeles County Bar Association or any of its committees or 
constituent groups. 
That disclaimer over, let me turn to the merits. 
AB 245: 1 think the change in Code of Civil 
Procedure section 128.5 proposed in this bill is well 
merited. If an action is taken in bad faith, it should be 
sufficient that it does cause unnecessary delay; it should 
not be necessary to establish that such delay was the only 
purpose of the actions or tactics. 
AB 1252: I see serious problems in this bill, as 
now written. It would appear to restrict the present 
broad scope of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 to 
personal injury and wrongful death litigation. 1 can see 
no reason for excepting sanctions for frivolous motions, 
etc. in other cases. 
I'm not sure that a restatement of "frivolous" is 
needed; present section 128.5 (especially if modified as 
proposed in AB 245) seems to be entirely adequate, and has 
now received a considerable case law gloss. 
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Chairman, Assembly 
Committee on Judiciary 
2. September 9, 1987 
Finally, I note the change that deletes 
"reasor..able expenees" ,gs the principle ma::.swre fot· fees. 
In its place, the bill appears to authorize a kind of 
fine--i.e., a penalty that would more than make the moving 
party whole. On the other hand, a $10,000 cap would be 
enacted, preventing a court from making a party whole in 
the rare case in which expenses caused by a bad faith 
tactic exceed $10,000. (Such matters are rare, but I have 
seen them.) And it is not clear if the $10,000 is an 
aggregate amount for all frivolous actions by all 
respondents. 
AB 1914: This measure appears to adopt the 
federal practice for state court proceedings. I think 
that is a good idea, although I would like to know more 
about how the federal rule was worked out. 
I hope this is useful. 
Sincerely yours, ?/ 
/' 
NLE:pp 
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Senior Consultant 
Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
state Capitol 
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In Re: AB 1252, AB 1914 
Dear Ms. DeBow: 
James R. McDaniel of Counsel 
Mary E. Healy David E. Agnew• 
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I write in response to the letter to me from Elihu M. 
Harris, Esq., Chair, Assembly Committee on the Judiciary. 
I cannot be available to provide testimony on these 
bills. However I have a few comments that you may wish to draw 
to the attention of the Committee. 
Although I am sympathetic to the concerns that clearly 
prompted these measures, I do not agree that these bills will 
have the positive effects that their sponsors hope to achieve. 
The purpose is to do something about court congestion and delay 
in the judicial system. As you know, provisions for sanctions 
for bad faith activities already exist in both the state and the 
federal systems. The results of the imposition of such sanctions 
has been almost uniformly discouraging. 
I commend to the attention of the Committee the 
sophisticated study by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice, 
6 Managing the Unmanageable: A History of Civil Delay in the Los 
Angeles Superior Court, 6 especially at pages 73-89 (1984). The 
documented conclusion of that study is as follows: 
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"Yet despite the Court's determined efforts 
in this regard in its faith that some of 
these procedures will result in a long-term 
reduction in delay, we have found no such 
long-term effect on the time-to-trial figures 
as a result of their imposition. As with the 
addition of judicial manpower, the imposition 
of these procedures could well have prevented 
or tempered subsequent increases in delay ••• 
but overall, the wait-to-trial continued 
upward i~ the Los Angeles Superior Court, 
particularly since the mid-1930's." 
The underlying assumption of sanction rules and 
statutes is that congestion and delay are at least partially 
caused by dilatory lawyers and by the filing of frivolous 
lawsuits. Some lawyers are dilatory and some lawsuits are 
frivolous, but the amount of litigation engendered by such 
practices is a trivial part of the caseload. As the Rand 
Institute study makes indelibly clear the basic problem is that 
as the population has escalated in the major urban centers of 
California, the demand for judicial services has exceeded the 
supply. When the problem is traffic jams on a freeway, it does 
not speed up the traffic to make cars move up faster on the on-
ramp. No matter how well intentioned proposals for sanctions 
have been (and they have always been well intentioned), the end 
product is to increase the amount of judicial time that must be 
spent per case to administer a sanctions program and since 
judicial time is the scarcest resource, the results are usually 
contrary to the draftmen's intent. Moreover, it is undeniable 
that imposing sanctions on lawyers increases the cost of delivery 
of legal services. 
I am opposed to these bills because, in my opinion, the 
result will be to increase, rather than decrease, congestion and 
delay in the California courts. 
SMH:sh 
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Ms. Deborah M. DeBow 
Senior Consultant 
Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
State Capitol 
Post Office Box 942849 
Sacramento, California 94249-0001 
Dear Ms. DeBow: 
Chairman Harris, by his letter of 1 September, 
requested my comments on Assembly Bills Numbers 245, 
1252 and 1914. I write in my capacity as an individual 
lawyer, not as a member of my firm. My background is 
as a lawyer who specializes in the field of legal mal-
practice and professional responsibility. I am the author 
of a treatise, Legal Malpractice, which will be published 
in the third editi~n by West Publishing within the next few 
months. I have also been Chairman of the ABA Standing Com-
mittee on Laywers• Professional Liability and am a present 
member of the Standing Committee on Lawyer Competence. 
Thus, in my practice and professional activities, I have 
become very familiar with the subject of attorney sanc-
tions. I will not be available, however, for the interim 
hearing on the 18th of September. 
I enclose as a research source, and not for 
republication because of the restricted copyright, draft 
materials of Sections 69.1-69.5, which will appear as part 
of the third edition of Legal Malpractice. The principal 
focus of the materials concerns the rapidly developing 
and confused application of Federal Rule 11. The federal 
court experience in the sanctions area proceeds upon the 
premise that the sanction power is salutory by eliminating 
unmeritorious and unreasonable claims, procedures and 
tactics. There has been a literal flood of litigation 
concerning the interpretation of Rule 11. For the lawyers, 
the uncertainty has created concern and risk since dif-
ference rules have been applied in different circuits. 
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There are many unanswered questions, such as the degree 
to which lawyers can continue to rely upon their clients 
for facts and whether they can trust what clients say. 
A major justification for Rule 11 is the per-
ception that the poor quality of claims and tactical 
activities can be controlled by imposing sanctions upon 
lawyers. Those sanctions have been very substantial and 
are typically not covered by lawyers' professional liability 
insurance. The countervailing concerns are twofold. First 
is the cost of sanctions to the legal profession. Second 
is the concern that lawyers' reaction to the threat of 
sanctions will be not to pursue otherwise meritorious claims 
or approaches out of personal concern. Unfortunately, we 
are still years away in terms of experience from being able 
to evaluate the impact of the countervailing justifications 
and concerns. A reality, however, is that whatever liti-
gation or tactics have been deterred by sanctions, there 
has been a substantial replacement with litigation over the 
propriety and meaning of those sanctions. 
The California experience has been relatively 
minimal. Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 has focused 
upon a subjective standard which requires the presence of 
bad faith or a total lack of merit. Thus, as a deterrent, 
Section 128.5 has dealt essentially with the most blatant 
abuses. If the purpose of Section 128.5 is to improve the 
quality of claims and litigation, then it has failed. If 
the sole purpose is to deal with extreme abuses, then Code 
of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 has served that purpose. 
In reviewing the three proposed pieces of legis-
lation, I comment as follows. I address first Assembly 
Bill Number 1252 because, in my opinion, it is the most 
inappropriate piece of legislation. First, for reasons 
not explained, the legislation is limited to "personal 
injury or death" actions. There is much litigation in-
volving contracts and economic issues which seem meaning-
less to exclude from the ambit of the proposal. The 
$10,000 limit is arbitrary and does not appear to have 
a counterpart in any other legislation I have seen in the 
- 35 -
Ms. Deborah M. DeBow 
September 9, 1987 
Page Three 
United States. Subdivision (c) is illogical. Although 
Subdivision {a) talks about "frivolous claims or defenses," 
Subdivision (c) requires a finding that "the entire case 
or defense" was frivolous. Thus, while the statute pur-
ports to provide sanctions for a frivolous claim, sanctions 
cannot lie unless the entire case was frivolous. The pro-
visions are not only inconsistent but illogical. Injury 
caused by a frivolous, coercive claim or a singular defense 
exists regardless of whether the entire proceeding is or is 
not meritorious. In my opinion, Assembly Bill Number 1252 
is inappropriate and so inartfully drafted as to likely 
engender significant litigation regarding its meaning. 
Assembly Bill Number 245 is an evolutionary re-
finement of Section 128.5. It appears to sharpen the stat-
ute's application by no longer requiring that the wrongful 
actions be solely intended to cause delay but merely cause 
delay. I see the change as minor both in legal effect and 
practical impact. 
Assembly Bill Number 1914 adds Code of Civil 
Procedure Section 447, which brings into play a California 
counterpart of Rule 11. If AB 1914 were adopted, then Code 
of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 would be redundant, perhaps 
inconsistent, and create confusion which would warrant the 
repeal of that section. On the positive side, the construc-
tion of Section 447 would be aided by a huge body of federal 
law on Rule 11. The California experience would then follow 
the federal courts, with the first consequence being the 
frequent application of the sanction rules, followed by a 
great increase in appellate review. 
In summary, my opinion is that Code of Civil 
Procedure Section 128.5 has had minimal impact upon the 
practice of law or the nature of litigation in California 
since it is designed to deal only with blatant abuses. In 
contrast, Rule 11 and the proposed comparable legislation 
in California is likely to have significant impact upon 
the quality of litigation and the style and cost of the 
practice of law. The unresolved issue remains whether 
the benefits of a Rule 11 approach outweigh the adverse 
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consequences. As a short-term solution, Rule 11 does appear 
to achieve salutary objectives. I remain uncertain about 
the long-term effects. 
I will be out of the country until the 28th of 
September. If I can be of further assistance, please advise. 
REM/dap 
Enclosures 
cc: Elihu M., Harris 
Sincerely, 
Ronald E. Mallen 
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COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814 
Roger K. Warren, Judge 
September 15, 1987 
Chairman, Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
State Capitol 
Post Office Box 942849 
Sacramento, California 94249-0001 
Attention: Ms. Deborah M. DeBow, Senior Consultant 
Re: Interim Hearing on Attorney Sanctions; 
AB 245 (Harris), AB 1252 (Zeltner), and 
AB 1914 (Harris) 
Dear Assemblyman Harris: 
The California Judges Association (CJA) supports the changes in 
the law of sanctions proposed in Assembly Bill 245 (Harris) and 
Assembly Bill 1914 (Harris) • CJA believes that such legislation will 
enhance the ability of the courts to regulate improper conduct of 
parties and counsel. 
CJA opposes Assembly Bill 1252 (Zeltner). The bill repeals the 
existing provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, which is 
the principal statutory basis for attorney sanctions in non-discovery 
matters. Inexplicably, the proposed Section 128.5 would apply only in 
actions for personal injury or death. 
CJA's Civil Law and Procedure Committee will be meeting in Los 
Angeles on September 22. Noting your solicitation from us of written 
legislative proposals consistent with the intent of the three pending 
bills, I will communicate any further comments or proposals on the 
subject to the Assembly Committee as shortly thereafter as possible. 
Thank you very much for soliciting our views on this subject. 
RKN/nsv 
Very truly yours, 
/c::-:!wARFEN, Chair 
California Judges Association 
Committee on Civil Law and Procedure 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: INTERESTED PERSONS 
FROM: 
DATE: 
RE: 
Elihu M. Harris, Chair 
Assembly Committee on Judiciary 
September 15, 1987 
Interim Hearing on Attorney Sanctions 
State Bar Convention 
Friday, September 18, 1987 
9:15 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. 
The Beverly Hilton Hotel 
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Enclosed is the informational packet for the Interim Hearing on 
September 18, 1987. 
W~ will be addressing issues presented in AB 245 (Harris), 
AB 1252 (Zeltner}, and AP 1914 (Harris) pertaining to sanctions 
against attorneys and parties for frivolous and bad faith actions 
or tactics. 
Included in the packet for purposes of comparison are SB 379 
(Presley), which limits the provisions also contained in A~ 1914 
to a 5-year pilot project to commence in Riverside and San 
Bernardino Counties, and SB 379 (Ellis), chaptered in 1985, which 
amended the sanction provisions contained in the Code of Civil 
Procedure Section 128.5 (see AB 245). The packet also contains 
correspondence and other relevant information to facilitate 
discussion at the hearing. 
We have solicited for the purposes of discussion at this hearing 
(a) written legislative proposals consistent with the intent of 
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INTERESTED PERSONS 
-2- September 15, 1987 
the pending bills; (b) persons with expertise in the area of 
attorney sanctions ~ho are interested in responding critically to 
the pending bills and/or any written legislative proposals: and 
(c) other written materials, articles, or comments with regards 
to the pending legislation or general area of attorney sanctions. 
Please direct questions to: Deborah M. DeBow, Senior Consultant, 
Assembly Committee on Judiciary, State Capitol, P.O. Box 942849, 
Sacramento, California, 94249-0001, (916) 445-4560. 
EMH:mea 
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CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
§ 128.5. [Payment of expenses attribut· 
able to bad faith actions or frivolous or 
delaying tactics] (a) Every trial court may 
order a party, the party's attorney, or both 
to pay any reasonable expenses, including 
attorney's fees, incurred by another party as 
a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that 
are frivolous or solely intended to cause 
unnecessary delay. This section also applies 
to judicial arbitration proceedings under 
Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 
1141.10) of Title 3 of Part 3. 
(b) For purposes of this section: 
(1) .. Actions or tactics" include, but are 
not limited to, the making or opposing of 
motions or the filing and service of a com-
plaint or cross-complaint. The mere filing of 
a complaint without service thereof on an 
opposing party does not constitute "actions 
or tactics" for purposes of this section. 
(2) .. Frivolous" means (A) totally and 
completely without merit or (B) for the sole 
purpose of harassing an opposing party. 
(c) Expenses pursuant to this section shall 
not be imposed except on notice contained 
in a party's moving or responding papers; or 
the court's own motion, after notice and 
opportunity to be hc:ard. An order imposing 
expenses shall be in writing and shall recite 
in detail the conduct or circumstances justi-
fying the order. 
(d) The liability imposed by this section is 
in addition to any other liability imposed by 
law for acts or omissions within the purview 
nf this section. Amended Stats 1985 ch 296 
. - 42 -
§ 177. Powers of judicial officers as to 
conduct of proceedings. Every judicial officer 
shall have power: 
I. To preserve and enforce order in his 
imm~iate presence, and in proceedings be-
fore h1m, when he is engaged in the perfor-
mance of official duty; · 
2. To compel obedience to his lawful or-
ders as provided in this code; 
3: T~ compel the attendance of persons to 
testify m a proceeding before him, in the 
cases and manner provided in this code; 
4. To administer oaths to persons in a 
proceeding pending before him, and in all 
other cases where it may be necessary in the 
exercise of his powers and duties. [1872; 
1880 ch 35 § 1.) Cal Jur 3d Affidavits and 
D~larations Under Penalty of Perjury § 10, 
Ev1dence § 405; Witkin Procedure (3d) 
Courts§§ 137, 138. 
§ 177.5. [Power to impose sanctions for 
violations of lawful orders] A judicial officer 
shall have the power to impose reasonable 
money sanctions, not to exceed fifteen hun-
dred dollars ($1,500), notwithstanding any 
~ther provision. of.l~w. payable to the county 
m wh1ch the JUdiCial officer is located for 
any violation of a lawful court order bY. a 
person, done without good cause or substan-
tial justification. This power shall not apply 
to ~dvocacy of counsel before the court. For 
the purposes of this section, the term .. per-
son" includes a witness, a party, a party's 
attorney, or both. 
Sanctions pursuant to this section shall 
not be imposed except on notice contained 
in a party's moving or responding papers; or 
on the court's own motion, after notice and 
opportunity to be heard. An order imposing 
sanctions shall be in writing and shall recite 
in detail the conduct or circumstances justi-
fying the order. [1982 ch 1564 § 1.] Witkin 
Procedure (3d) Courts § 141; Trial§ 67. 
§ 178. [Power] to punish for contempt. 
For the effectual exercise of the powers 
conferred by the last section, a judicial offi-
cer may punish for contempt in the cases 
··provided in this code. [1872; 1880 ch 35 
§ 1.) 14 Cal Jur 3d Contempt § 4. 
§ 907. [Costs on frivolous or delaying 
appeal.] When it appears to the reviewing 
court that the appeal was frivolous or taken 
solely for delay, it may add to the costs on 
appeal such damages as may be just. [1968 
ch 385 § 2; former § 907 repealed 1933 ch 
744 § 198.] Cal Jur 3d Appellate Review 
§§ 581, 601, 680, 705; Cal Practice Rev Ch 
53 Planning After Trial; Cal Practice § 61 :2; 
Witkin Procedure (3d) Appeal §§ 18, 532, 
533, 535. 
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" 
Existing CCP 128. 5 
am AB 1914 (Harris) and 
DESCRIProRS AB 245 (Harris) ISSOES AB 1252 (zeltner) ISSOES *SB 379 (Presl~) ISSUES 
1) Code section OCP 128.5 amended. OCP 128.5 amended CCP 447 added. 
:lltpacted: to add: 
2) Civil penalty: Unspecified. Up to $10,000 penalty. "AWJ:Cpriate sanction" 
Penalty unspecified. 
3) Civil Reasooable expenses ShcW.d there be Attorney fees & costs. ~le expenses, 
sancticn: including attorney fees. a penalty in including attorney fees. 
excess of expenses? 
4) Sanction :im- Party, attorney or both. Attorney or party. Attorney or party. 
p::>sed against: 
5) Types of cases All act:ials including Persooal injury/wrongful All actions. 
saJ'¥:tion is arbi trati.cn. death 
ctR?licable: 
6) Conditioos Bad faith act:ials or tactics Sb:Juld this pro- Frivolous llDtions Unclear if <XD- Plead:i.nq, llDtians or other 
for ctR?lying that are frivolous or that vision read "not or plaints are paper signed certified after 
sanction: are solely i.nt:eD3ed to done in good asserting frivolous claims included. reasonable inprl.ry, that it 
cause unnecessary delay. faith"? or defenses is well~ in fact and 
.. or war.ranted by existing law 
AB 245 deletes "solely in- Are "delay" pro- causing unnecessary delay. or a good faith azgument for 
-!'- tended" so as to pemi.t vi.sions too extension/md:i.ficaticn or 
-!'-
sanctions to he inp:)sed when bread? Shoold reversal of existing law and 
an action or tactic causes statute need not interposed for illproper 
unnecessary delay. "intent"? ~. 
ShcW.d statute 
:retain "solely 
i.ntellded"to 
cause delay? 
Existing OCP 128 • 5 
and 
DESC'RIPIDRS J\B 245 (Harris) 
7) Definitims 
far applica-
tioo of 
sanctions: 
.Actims/tactics defined as 
rnalti.rw:;/q.poslJ1ii JIDtims or 
filing & service of a:m-
plaint. & ~laint. 
Frivoloos defined as totally 
& ~etely Wit'Jla.Jt merit 
or far sole purpose of harass. 
8) When sanction Specifies hearing upon notice. 
may be Requires order to specify 
ilrp:leed: ccnduct. 
9) other: 
Caments: When a party coo.l.d havP. set a 
not!~ in 21 days b:rt sets it in 
six weeks, should sanctims be 
available? 
.~"-
"' 
If both parties act. together to 
delay a case, should the court: 
have the power to .iapose sanctims 
oo both parties? Who is to receive 
the proceeds ftall the sanction in 
this situatioo? 
ISSUES J\B 1252 (Zeltner) 
Defines frivolous notioo, 
claim or defense as: 
a) made in bad faith either 
for prolonging or delaying 
ISSUES 
litigation and to harass Should not "and" 
another party, or, be "or"? 
b) made wi tha1t any reasoo-
able basis in law or fact. and 
lacking any good faith~ 
ment for an extension, roodi-
fication or reversal of 
existir¥] law. 
Court may assess sanctions 
at the t.inw:! it rules on 
110tion, claim or defense or 
at t.inw:! of judgment, if it 
finds entire case or 
defense was frivolous. 
AR 1914 (Harris) and 
*SB 379 (Presley) 
Specifies :iJiprqJer purpose as: 
to harass or cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in 
cost. Failure to certify 
requires strikinq of the 
JIDtioo or other paper. 
Certified in violatioo 
subjects party or attorney 
to sanctioos. 
ISSUES 
R> indicatioo as to when 
court: assesses sanction. 
Shoold not the 
requ.irEment of 
notice and hear-
ing oo the IIDtion 
be specified in 
the statute. 
*1987 - to enrollment. 
I.'RGISLATIVF HISTORY 
The Legislature added Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 
(CCP 128.5) in 1981 to give trial court judges the power to 
impose sanctions against attorneys who pursue bad faith tactics 
or actions which are frivolous or which cause unnecessary delay. 
The courts [Baugess v. Paine (1978) 22 3d 626] determined that 
the power to assess sanct1ons was not an inherent power of the 
court. 
Proponents of the original bill (SB 947) asserted that frivolous 
motions consumed court time and increased litigation costs. 
Opponents feared that such ability to sanction would inhibit the 
proper advocacy by counsel. 
In 1984, CCP 128.5 was amended to apply to arbitration 
proceedings. (AB 2752) 
The 1985 amendments (SB 379) to CCP 128.5 recast the basis for 
imposing sanctions and defined "actions or tactics" and 
"frivolous." The application of CCP 128.5 to the filing and 
service of a complaint or cross-complaint was specified. 
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ASSEMBLY COMMIITEE ON JUDICI.AJ~:.­
ELIHU M. HARRIS, Chairman 
Prepared by 
R. LeBov 
BILL: SB 947 
(As amended 8/18/81) 
HEARING DATE: 8/26/81 
SEN. JUD. COY~. VOTE: (5-0) 
SENATE FLOOR VOTE: (31-0) 
AUTHOR: Davis 
SUBJECT: 
This bill is intended to give trial courts the statutory 
authority to award attorneys' fees as sanctions. 
ANALYSIS: 
The California Supreme Court has held that, pursuant to 
its supervisory power, a trial court may "take appropriate 
action to secure compliance with its orders, to punish con-
tempt, and to control its proceedings" but that, absent 
statutory authority, a court may not award attorneys' fees 
as a sanction under its supervisory power. [Baugess v 
Paine, 22 Cal. 3d 626 (1978)] 
This bill would authorize a trial court to require a party 
or the party's attorney, or both,-to pay any reasonable 
expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by another 
party as a result of tactics or actions not based on good 
faith which are frivolous or which cause unnecessary delay. 
STAFF COMMENTARY: 
1. In Bauguess, the Supreme Court held that if trial 
courts had "the inherent power to impose sanctions 
in the form of attorney's fees for alleged miscon-
duct, trial courts would be given a power without 
procedural limits and potentially subject to abuse." 
The court cited Young v Redman (55 Cal. App. 3d 827) 
in which the Court of Appeal observed that "such power 
in the trial court, unfettered and unbridled, with-
out appropriate safeguards and guidelines could cancel 
(CONTINUED) 
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RL 
SB 947 HEARING DATE: 8/26/81 
2. 
3. 
any b~nefits derived to the judicial process by gener-
ating a proliferation of appeals" and that therefore 
"[Any) power of the trial court to impose such sanctions 
should be created by the legislative branch of govern-
ment with appropriate safeguards and guidelines de-
veloped following a thorough indepth investigation." 
Does this bill contain such appropriate safeguards 
and guidelines or is it potentially subject to abuse? 
Judge Weil of the Los Angeles Superior Court states 
that his court's "law and motion departments.are 
cluttered up with (frivolous) motions that consume 
vasts amounts of judicial time and require unnecessary 
and espensive appearances to bemade by lawyers re-
sisting these motions." He therefore urges enactment 
of this bill in order to "empower the trial court judge 
to impose sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees in 
favor of parties who must resist frivolous motions 
brought solely for the purpose of delay. 
Opponents of this bill fear that authorizing trial 
courts to award attorneys' fees as a sanction could 
imperil the independence of the bar and inhibit zealous 
advocacy by counsel. In this regard the American 
Civil Liberties Union points out that raising all 
possible motions is part of an atto"rney's responsi-
bility of serving his or her client. The ACLU further 
states that "Determination as to whether a motion is 
frivolous is subject to abuse of judicial discretion. 
If a motion has .been denied, a judge might be more 
susceptible to a determination that such a motion was 
frivolous. Furthermore, some attorneys might be in-
clined to use motions for sanctions as a delaying 
tactic. 
"In many instances, judges already have the discretion 
to grant or deny hearings on motions. ~Tiere it is 
determined that a motion is frivolous, the judge is 
free to deny the hearing. Attorneys also may bring 
motions for sanctions now. If the motions have merit, 
sanctions can be awarded." 
::: ::.·~·::. ·:.: ·.:: ·. ·::~·::::: :;.: :::::.:: 
hoo.o•••-~~~•••~••••••*-•••~•••· 
··-··-··@··········--~----···-· 
••••u•~-•~•••-•••••--•,.•--• 
······-····--·-········-······· 
···-·························· 
············--·-·-·············· ·········-·····-··········~---­··-······-----~----········ 
···-·····-··-······-······· 
•••••••••••u••••••-••••••••••·• 
ri:::::::~!!!!!!!!iH¥.¥f 
------·---------
___________ ,. _______ _ 
-•-•••••••••••-••-••••u~••• 
·-·~ .......... ~ ......... -...... -.. 
-······~-----·-··········-
-------·--· 
·--·-----·-··-----· 
--·--· .. --------.. ···-·-· 
-----. ----· ···---~·--···-~-----···-· 
·-------·-
--..... ·----·---····-··-· 
······················-···-····· 
• u-•~•••••••••••-•••••-•••-· 
-----·-· --~-- .. --~-·------ -· ···-···· ........ ___ .... _____ _ 
··-···---······-· 
------· 
·-·-··--··--·--·-
-··-·-···········-······-
----------·····-
--*·---~ .. ~---~-----·-· ·~---h~~···-···*··--······-· 
-----.. ·-····--·······--·--· ··-~-~----------······-
. CALIFOlt!\:IA LEGISL4, TURE-1983-84 REGULAR SESSION 
. ASSEMBLY BILL No. 2752 
Introduced by Assembly Member Harris 
February 7, 1984 
An act to amend Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, relating to judicial arbitration. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 2752, as introduced, Harris. Judicial arbitration. 
Existing law authorizes a trial court to require a party or the 
party's attorney, or both, to pay any reasonable expenses 
incurred by another party as a result of tactics or actions not 
based on good faith which are frivolous or cause unnecessary 
delay, as specified. 
This bill would make those provisions also applicable in 
judicial arbitration proceedings. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no . 
State-mandated local program: no . 
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
1 SECTION 1. Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil 
-2 Procedure is amended to read: 
3 128.5. (a) Every trial court shall have the power to 
4 order a party or the party's attorney, or both, to pay any 
5 reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred 
6 by another party as a result of tactics or actions not based 
7 on good faith which are frivolous or which cause 
8 unnecessary delay. Frivolous actions or delaying tactics 
9 include, but are not limited to, making or opposing 
10 motions without good faith. This section also applies to 
11 judicial arbitration proceedings under Chapter 2.5 
12 (commencing with Section 1141.10) of Title 3 of Part 3. 
9950 
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AB 2752 -2-
1 (b) Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be 
2 imposed except on notice contained in a party's moving 
3 or responding papers; or the courfs own motion, after 
4 notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing 
5 expenses shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the 
6 conduct or circumstances justifying the order. 
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ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 
ELIHU M. BARRIS, Chairman 
AB 2752 (Harris) As introduced 02/07/84 
SUBJECT 
AB 2752 
This bill is intended to permit the imposition of costs and 
attorneys' fees when frivolous actions or delaying tactics are 
used in judicial arbitration. 
DIGEST 
Existing law authorizes a trial court to require a party or the 
party's attorney or both to pay reasonable expenses, including 
attorneys' fees, incurred by another party as a result of tactics 
or actions, not based on good faith, which are frivolous or which 
cause unnecessary delay. 
This bill would specifically provide that the provisions 
authorizing imposition of reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees 
for frivolous acts or delaying would apply to judicial 
arbitration proceedings. 
STAFF COMMENTS 
1. The State Bar and the Judicial Council are joint sponso~s of 
this bill. It is their position that some parties are 
abusing the judicial arbitration process by either failing to 
participate in the hearings or by utilizing delaying tactics 
during the arbitration proceedings. The sources suggest that 
such conduct defeats the purpose of judicial arbitration 
(i.e. expeditious resolution of the case). 
wnile. the sources suggest that a court currently may have the 
power to impose the sanctions authorized by Code of Civil 
Procedure Section 128.5 for dilatory tactics used in judicial 
arbitration, they believe that this bill is necessary to 
remove all doubt. 
3. This bill would specifically authorize a court to impose 
costs, including an opponent's attorneys' fees, against a 
party or the party's attorney, for tactics or actions used in 
arbitration proceedings which are not based on good faith and 
are frivolous or cause unnecessary delay. However, these 
sections may not be imposed unless the affected party has 
been given notice and an opportunity to be heard. Further, 
the order imposing the sanction must be in writing and recite 
in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order. 
C c: :-. .s ·...:.:.-:.c.:-:.-:. F, • _. • :L::: ?~ z 
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2. The courts have held that despite a party's wilful refusal to 
appear at an arbitration proceeding, that party has an 
established right to a trial de novo (or court trial) after 
the arbitration award has been filed. (See Herbert v Hain, 
153 Ca.App.3d 465 (1982). This bill, contends the sources, 
may "ameliorate the unfairness" that results when a party 
requests a trial de novo after failing to appear and 
participate in a judicial arbitration hearing. The bill, 
argue the sources, would permit a court to force the party 
who fails to appear at arbitration hearings to bear the 
burden of costs and attorneys' fees incurred by the party who 
attended and prevailed at the hearing. 
Cc~sul~a~~ R. ~. ~o~ez 
~: :S/E~ - 53 -
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Pase : 
SOURCE 
State Bar of California 
Judicial Council 
SUPPORT 
Cal-Tax 
OPPOSITION 
Unknown 
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Senate Bill No. 379 
CHAPTER 296 
An act to amend Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 
relating to civil actions. 
[Approved by Governor July 26, 1985. Filed with 
Secretary of State July 29, 1985.) 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
SB 379, Ellis. Sanctions for bad-faith judicial actions. 
Existing law authorizes a trial court to require a party, the party's 
attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses incurred by another 
party as a result of tactics or actions not based on good faith which 
are frivolous or cause unnecessary delay, as specified. Existing law 
also provides separate actions for abuse of judicial process and 
malicious prosecution. 
This bill would revise the above provisions for award of expenses 
by making these provisions applicable to bad-faith tactics or actions 
which are intended to cause unnecessary delay or are employed 
solely to harass an opposing party or are totally and completely 
without merit, rather than tactics or actions which cause unnecessary 
delay. The bill would define "actions and tactics" to include, but not 
be limited to, the making or opposing of motions and the filing and 
service of a complaint or cross-complaint. "Actions and tactics" 
would not include the mere filing of a complaint without service 
upon an opposing party. 
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
SECTIO!\ 1. Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure is 
amended to read: 
128.5. (a) Every trial court may order a party, the party's 
attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses, including 
attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith 
actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to cause 
unnecessary delay. This section also applies to judicial arbitration 
proceedings under Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1141.10) 
of Title 3 of Part 3. 
(b) For purposes of this section: 
(1) "Actions or tactics" include, but are not limited to, the making 
or opposing of motions or the filing and service of a complaint or 
cross-complaint. The mere filing of a complaint without service 
thereof on an opposing party does not constitute "actions or tactics" 
for purposes of this section. 
(2) "Frivolous" means (A) totally and completely without merit 
or (B) for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party. 
95 50 
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(c) Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be imposed except 
on notice contained in a party's moving or responding papers; or the 
court's own motion, after notice and opportunity to be heard. An 
order imposing expenses shall be in writing and shall recite in detail 
the conduct or circumstances justifying the order. 
(d) The liability imposed by this section is in addition to any other 
liability imposed by law for acts or omissions within the purview of 
this section. 
0 
95 60 
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Date of Hearing: June 11, 1985 SB 379 
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 
ELIHU M. HARRIS, Chairman 
SB 379 (Ellis) - As Amended: June 20, 1985 
PRIOR ACTION 
Sen. Jud. Com. 7-0 Sen. Floor 38-0 
SUBJECT: This bill revises the authority of a court to impose sanctions for 
tactics or actions which are not done in good faith and are frivolous or cause 
delay . 
DIGEST 
Existing law authorizes a trial court to require a party, the party's attorney, 
or both to pay reasonable expenses incurred by another party as a result of 
tactics or actions not based on good faith, which are frivolous or cause 
unnecessary delay. 
Existino law also provides separate actions for abuse of judicial process and 
malicious prosecution, and grants courts the power to impose contempt sanctions 
for the misconduct of attorneys or parties. 
This bill: 
1) Deletes the statutory language which permits an award of expenses 
resulting from tactics or actions not based on good faith which cause 
unnecessary delay; 
2) Authorizes an award of expenses resulting from tactics or actions 
brought in bad faith which are solely intended to cause unnecessary 
delay; 
3) Defines dCtions and tactics as including the filing and serving of a 
complaint or cross-complaint, but excludes a complaint or 
cross-complaint filed but not served; 
4) Defines a frivolous action or tactic as one brought solely to harass or 
which is totallj and completely without merit. 
FISCAL EFFECT 
None 
- continued -
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1. The existing statute, Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) Section 128.5, does: 
(a) Not specify that sanctions may be imposed by the trial court for filing 
of a frivolous complaint or cross-complaint or for filing a complaint 
or cross-complaint which causes unnecessary delay. 
(b) Not specifically permit imposition of a penalty for tactics, actions, 
or the filing of a complaint/cross-complaint which may be intended to 
cause delay but, in fact, causes no delay. 
(c) Permit imposition of a penalty for tactics or actions, not based on 
good faith, which cause unnecessary delay. 
(d) Specify that reimbursement may be ordered by the trial court for 
reasonable expenses incurred in defending against tactics or actions 
which are frivolous and not based on good faith. 
2. According to the sponsor, this bill is needed to deter a party and/or 
attorney from filing frivolous complaints or cross-complaints. It is argued 
that when such conduct is in bad faith, the party and/or attorney 
perpetrating the conduct should be liable for any reasonable expenses (e.g.~ 
attorneys' fees) incurred by the other party. 
Proponents state that there are limited remedies for bogus complaints. The 
pursuit of a malicious prosecution action, although an available remedy, is 
costly, time-consuming, subject to a difficult standard of proof for 
damages, and emotionally traumatic to the plaintiff. Further, it may be 
difficult to locate an attorney willing to pursue a malicious prosecution 
action. Usually the plaintiff merely desires to be reimbursed his/her 
expenses incurred in defending against the underlying unmeritorious 
complaint, which this bill would permit. 
3. Current provisions of law provide both courts and parties alternative 
methods of redress in instances of deliberate malfeasance. Causes of action 
are available, such as malicious prosecution and abuse of process, which 
have evolved standards to preserve and protect a person's right to access to 
the courts, while permitting another to collect damages for abuse and misuse 
of the litigation process. Alternatively, courts have discretion to impose 
contempt sanctions for misconduct of an attorney or party. 
5. The statute currently uses the standard of "not based on good faith" in 
determining the appropriateness for awarding expenses. This standard is 
undefined, broad and vague. Thus, this bill requires that such tactics or 
- continued -
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actions must be found to be done in bad faith prior to the imposition of 
sanctions. Such amendment would likely reduce the chilling effect on 
parties who wish to exercise appropriate litigation rights. 
This bill also defines frivolous actions or tactics to be those which are 
brought solely to harass the opposing party or which are totally and 
completely without merit. 
The "bad faith" standard and definition of frivolous are consistent with 
case law interpreting Code of Civil Procedure Section 907, which assesses 
sanctions for frivolous appeals. In In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 
Cal.3d 637, the California Supreme Court disallowed the sanctions that the 
court of appeal had imposed on an attorney under Code of Civil Procedure 
Section 907 and Rule 26(a) for pursuing a frivolous appeal. The Supreme 
Court pointed out that there was no clear definition of the concept 
"frivolous ... The court suggested that a carefully framed definition, 
"surrounded by procedural protections and sparingly applied ..• can serve the 
important purpose of penalizing the most egregious conduct without deterring 
valid appellate claims." The court further stated that "an appeal should be 
held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive-to 
harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment or when tt 
indisputably has no merit ... " 
The court in Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Stockton Port Dist. 
(1983) 140 Cal .App.3d 111, 116, stated: "The fact that an action is 
determined to be 'without merit' does not, a fortiori, place it in the 
category of frivolous .•. Obviously, where an action is initiated for an 
improper motive, or a party knows or should know the facts or law or both 
preclude the action or any recovery, yet prosecutes the action in any event, 
the question of a frivolous action is raised ... The Legislature did not 
intend, however, to chill the valid assertion of a litigant's rights against 
a public entity or any other defendant. For this reason, it is clear 
sanctions should not be imposed except in the clearest of cases." (Citing 
Flaherty) 
6. This bill also authorizes the court to impose sanctions upon the filing and 
serving of a complaint or cross-complaint which was solely intended to cause 
delay. The mere filing of a complaint or cross-complaint (e.g., to protect 
the statute of limitations), without service of the complaint or 
cross-complaint, will not subject such party to sanctions under Civil 
Procedure Code Section 128.5. 
However, the discovery statutes restrict commencement of discovery (e.g., 
interrogatories, depositions, subpoenas) until after service of the 
complaint, thus limiting plaintiff's ability to investigate and to determine 
the merit of a claim. 
- continued -
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7. Although taking no position on this bill, the Attorney General notes that: 
Support 
The potential effect of these changes is not clear. Current law allows 
sanctions for actions and tactics which either cause unnecessary delay 
or are frivolous: the bill would apparently delete the possibility of 
sanctions where unnecessary delay was in fact caused, and allow them 
only if delay was intended. As phrased, a court thus would apparently 
have no power to order sanctions where unintentional unnecessary delay 
was in fact caused. 
Moreover, the bill would require a judge to determine the subjective 
purpose of a party, rather than determining only the effect of the 
action or tactic; it thus may in practice lessen the possibility of 
sanctions, since subjective intent is difficult to prove. Actual delay 
is at least objectively recognizable. In addition, any action or 
tactic which is intended to cause unnecessary delay probably is already 
subject to sanction as "frivolous," and it is difficult to see what the 
new language adds. 
Opposition 
County Supervisors Association of 
California 
American Civil Liberties Union 
D. DeBow 
445-4560 
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AMERICAN CNIL LII3EP.TIES UNION 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE OFFICE 
1127 11th Street. Suite 602 0 
Sacramento. California 95814 
Telephone (916) 442-1 036 0 
Members 
Assembly Judiciary Committee 
State Capitol Building 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Dear Members: 
June 10, 1985 
Re: ·~B 379 (Amended)-
tlppose 
Please be advised that the ACLU opposes SB 379 which seeks 
to expand the grounds upon which an attorney or party may be 
sanctioned for bad faith in civil proceedings. 
The current provisions of law provide both courts and parties 
adequate methods of redress in instances of deliberate malfeasance. 
However. the additional authority proposed in SB 379 would authorize 
the levying of what are essentially punitive damages against a 
party or counsel for the filing of a civil complaint or cross-
complaint. Such action by counsel may be appropriate and to act other-
wise may constitute actionable malpractice. Particularly in 
cases of police abuse, both ci vi 1 and criminal defense counsel 
may be dissuaded from fully representing a client's interests. 
In its present form, SB 379 allows for an award of punitive 
damages where tactics or actions "are intended to caus~ unnecessary 
delay". This standard is vague and may include through its over-
breadth actions which lead to postponements that are entirely 
justified on the basis of the facts and circumstances of a parti-
cular case. The proposed rule would also allow opposing counsel 
to 'second guess' the moving party. It is not clear whether this 
bill would allow opposing counsel to challenge a delay that had 
been granted or that had been denied before or after the actual 
trial proceeding. We are also concerned that because of the in-
tent standard, an attorney may be required to divulge information 
and strategy that could not otherwise be required for disclosure 
because of work-product rules. 
We feel that such precedent is both dangerous and unnecessary. 
The proposed rule may discourage attorneys from accepting cases 
that may require the filing of complaints and cross-complaints. 
And, it would also penalize those who acted at the direction of 
a client with a bona fide belief that the filing of such an action 
was appropriate and necessary to gain legal redress. 
Daphne L. Macklin. legislative Advocate • MarJorie C Swartz. legislative Advocate • Rita M. Egri. legislative Assistant 
AQU of Northern California • Dorothy M Ehrlich. Executive Director AQU ci Southern California • P.omono Ripston. Executive Director 
166J Mission Street. Su1te 460•Son Fronosco. 94100•(415)621-2493 6JJ South Shatto Place • los Angeles. 90005 • (21 J) 487-1720 
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Given these concerns, we see no basis for amending the 
current law and urge tbat you vote ag~inst this proposal. 
Respectfully, 
·-u ?L"-~t.k D~~E L. MACKLIN 
Legislative Advocate 
/lt~;·c-.d t ~ch 
MARJORIE C. SWARTZ 
Legislative Advocate 
cc: Consultant, Assembly Judiciary Committee 
senator Jfm Ellfs · 
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BIL! ~0.: SD 379 ANALYST: Richard C. Jacobs 
DATE: April 18, 1985 
PHONE: (8) 597-0285 
/ jt_j_ 
Analys:i.::; 
Cod~ of Civil Proced~re section 128.5 now provides that trial 
cotJrts have the po~cr to order a party or the party's attorney to 
~~Y ~100pposing party's reasonable expenses, including attorney's 
feo~, inc~rr~d as a result of tactics or actions, not taken in 
ooc ... : fait!:, \.'llich are frivolou::; or which cause unnecessary delay. 
': Li :.: l i 11 \..;:)ul-:1 <:t:nerld sestion 12 8. 5 in two ways. It first would 
::111m; a cou.r::. to make thE specified award not for tactics or 
act.~ on.s wL1cJ: caused unnecessary delay, but for those which were 
"int.::~:-~ded" to cause: unnect.:>ssary delay; second, the bill would 
;:'c· Jfic;1ll,· Jn,·lulk tnt· filin9 of a civjl COLtl;L:d.nt or cross-
,:~ru;,L·i:1t 1'1 L :u faj til <1S a possible ~1r0uncl for an awurd of 
I • >- I ;. \ } l . ( ~.; • 
Trc !.-'.::.r ... c;tlaJ L'£ feet of tht:se changes is not cle:ar. Current la'.'v' 
::.1 J l ''· s s~nc :..i c:·.:. for. acti OilS and tactics which either cause 
1·:~:·~-·:c:;£:'ll'Y c'.<.:::..-...y 01 arc frivolous: t.hP bill would apparently 
,:-::,-~. ... Uii" ~,·.·:.:,-s"bil:t::::· o• san.:::.ions y;J:ere unnecessary delay was in-
fr=F~"- cc.usc.~, ant.J al]ow them or,ly if delay was intended. As phrased, 
<... ·v . .: t tr::J:: ·,.,·0ulc" a?pare:.tly haV(' no pow2r to order sanctions 
·,.:,,c:::c c·ir.':t..r.t~o;l:.l unn(C'2SSc'l"'{ delay ~n'as in fact caused. 
:: .. :..=':..ver, t.i;.e biJ.l woulu rec;uirc a j'.ldge to de-::err.1ine the 
:" ;_: ~ · J E.::: t.: vc.· pur; .c•E.t· of a par cy, rather than determining only the 
,_fL~ct of t.he ac·:ion or tactici it thus may in practice lessen 
· .. :c F-:~,f~:.J-:lJit:,· of san::tions, since subjective intent is difficult 
to :·rO\·e .. :\clual delay is at least objectively recognizable. 
:i ;, ;.d5i b l .1, z,·;'-· a.ction or tactic which is intended to cause 
U!···-:·ce"'s.:ny uc-la_: probably is already subject to sanction as 
'':.r>.·olo'.l['.•· a:1c: it is difficult to see ~n'hat ths new language adds. 
'.'1> :.;ort.ion of t.he t.ill including complaints and cross-complaints 
a.~- . c,ss.l.01 e exar"ples of frivolous actions or delaying tactics 
a~;pl~ars tc· bE: i.r::-tc.:cessary. In Citv of Lof!il' Beach v. Bozek_ {1982) 
31 Ci:l.3d 527, the Court concluded that a C1ty could not pursue 
~- m._l ic i :Jl::.:; r:r' '::-l_ cution action ayainst a de fend ant who had 
l're\·io:.u::ly '.:1:successfully sued the City, but cited section 128.5 
c,s , ;)ossih:e r.tc~ans by \-:hich the City could recover its expenses. 
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BiJl Nc. SF. 379 
J 1 • RccOT1':'i<.'Ilc:.J t ion 
Tt0 law allrn:ing sanctions for frivolous actions or tactics 
cr those ~h~ch cause unnecessary delay in litigation ought 
to be clear so that th~ trial courts can use it effectively. 
T1d s bill introduces cor1fusing language, and may in fact be 
counterproductive. 
DP. 
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DIGEST 
Appeals: Sanctions 
\mends Code of Civil Procedure section 907 to require notice and a written recitation of ( 
JUdicial justification when sanctions for a frivolous or dilatory appeal are imposed. 
RESOLUTIONS COMMITIEE REPORT 
Recommend APPROVE IN PRINCIPLE 
Reasons: 
This resolution would require that the imposition of sanctions for a frivolous or 
dilatory appeal must be with notice and that the court must issue a detailed written 
order reciting the basis for the sanctions. The resolution would protect against 
abuses of the sanctions power without changing the substantive basis for awarding 
sanctions. 
The proponent cites two major reasons for the proposed amendment: (1) under 
current law, courts may impose sanctions ,without any esgep~le basis; and (2) 
under current law, sanctions may be imposed for an appeal taken as a oelaying 
tactic even though the appeal is not frivolous. 
The proposed amendment is desirable in that it would require the appellate court to 
recite in detail the circumstances justifying the award and the basis on which the 
court arrived at the amount of the award. Such a requirement would aid the 
Supreme Court, in those instances in which a petition for hearing is granted, in 
determining whether an award of sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 
907 was appropriate. 
~ 
' However, the proposed amendment would not, as the proponent suggests, affect the 
: appellate courts' present ability to award sanctions where an appeal is taken solely 
/ for purposes of delay, but is not frivolous. The proposed amendment, patterned 
f. after Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, specifically provides that sanctions 
1U' may be awarded as a result of actions not based on good faith which are frivolous or 
' which cause unnecessary delay. Thus, the basis for imposing sanctions remains the 
same under present Code of Civil Procedure section 907 and the proposed 
amendment. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
SECTION/COMMITTEE REPOR'IS 
COMMITTEE ON ADMimSTRATION OF JUSTICE 
Recommend APPROVE IN PRINCIPLE 
Reasons: 
Present law allows an appellate court to impose sanctions for frivolous appeals or delays. This 
proposal clarifies the procedures to be used by appellate courts in imposing such sanctions, by 
adopting the procedures applicable to trial courts under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. 
The same result could be achieved by repealing Code of Civil Procedure section 907 and 
amending section 128.5 to make it applicable to "trial or appellate courts." 
1984 CONFERENCE 2-29a-84 
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TEXT OF RESOLUTION 
RESOLVED that the Conference of Delegates recommends that Legislation 
be sponsored to amend Section 907 of the Code of Civil Procedure to 
read as follows: 
1 ~7-
2 fat w~~~-~~--~···-~G-~~-*~v~~w~~s-~•~-~-~-~~--~«l 
3 was-~•~vQJ~•-~-~k~~-~QJ¥-~~-4~l•¥~-~~m«¥-a44-~~Q-~~ 
4 Qn-«~«l-~~~-4amas~•-••-m«¥-~-~~~. 
5 
6 S907 
7 (a} The reviewing court shall have the power to order a 
B party to pay reasonable expenses or damages, or both, including 
9 attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a result of 
10 tactics or actions not based on good faith which are frivolous 
11 or which cause unnecessary delay. Frivolous actions or delaying 
12 tactics include, but are not limited to, taking or opposing an 
13 appeal without good faith. 
14 (b) No award pursuant to this section shall be imposed 
15 except on notice contained in a party's moving or responding 
16 papers; or the court's own motion, after notice and oppor-
17 tunity to be heard. An award pursuant to this section shall 
18 be in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or cir-
19 cumstances justifying the award and the basis on which the 
20 court arrived at the amount of the award. 
(Proposed new language underlined; language to be deleted stricken) 
PROPONENT Beverly Hills Bar Association 
... 
STATEMENT OF REASONS 
In Hersch v. Citizens Savings & Loan Assn., 146 Cal.App.3d 1002 
(1983), the court imposed $125,000 in "damages pursuant to Code 
of Civil Procedure §907 , 11 even though the court said that the amount 
of such damages could not be ascertained: 
"Having determined that the appeal in this 
case was taken for the purpose of delay, we must 
address the subject (sic) appropriate remedy. The 
statute itself provides that damages may be added 
to the costs on appeal. Although the actual 
damages sustained by plaintiffs in the form of 
lost interest might be appropriately assessed, 
there is nothing in the record here from which 
calculation of such an amount can be made. No 
inquiry was made into the subject • • • nor 
were counsel placed on notice that any such 
inquiry might be made. Absent any basis for 
direct measurement of damages, we are left to 
assess such an amount as will bear some 
rational relationship to the circumstances 
of the parties and to the purpose of Code of 
Civil Procedure §907. 
1984 CONFERENCE 
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"We find to be just, and add to plaintiff's 
costs on appeal, damages in the sum of $125,000. 
Attorney's fees on appeal are awarded to plaintiffs 
in an amount to be determined by the trial court." 
(146 Cal.App.3d at 1013). 
We believe that a statute which authorizes a court to make an award 
of $125,000 in sanctions without any ascertainable basis is just 
too vulnerable to abuse. 
Another problem with the statute as presently written is the state-
ment in the Hersch opinion that such sanctions could be imposed 
for an appeal taken for purposes of delay even though that appeal 
was not frivolous. We do not believe that a party should be 
penalized for taking action which has potential merit. 
The amended statute trac~ California Code of Civil Procedure 
§128.5 added in 1981, applicable to trial courts, which expresses 
the Legislature's latest thoughts in this area. 
This proposed amendment does not affect any other law, statute or 
rule. 
AUTHOR/PE~1ANENT CONTACT Peter Appleton (213) 553-6822 
COUNTER-ARGUMENT TO RESOLUTION 2-29-84 
San Diego County Bar Association 
Recent case law at the appellate and supreme court level has set 
forth the circumstances and procedure for sanctions at the 
appellate level. The appeal process is unlike the process in 
the trial court in that the case has already been litigated and 
resulted in an award which is presumed correct. The appellate 
court has the full record of trial court proceedings before it and 
should have the authority to fashion sanctions which fit the facts 
of an individual case. There is some question as to whether 
existing Code of Civil Procedure §128.5 allows an award of 
sanctions over and above actual expenses incurred by the 
opposing litigant. The present proposal would inject that same 
uncertainty at the appellate level. 
COUNTER-ARGUMENT TO RESOLUTION 2-29-84 
Santa Clara County Bar Association 
This Resolution attenpts to limit the authority of appellate courts 
( 
to impose sanctions for "frivolous" appea.ls. While the goal is good, 
the attempt is both deficient and results in a broadening of t.he 
sanction power. The Resolution appears to permit sanctions where th~( 
Court finds an appeal was taken for delay, even though the case was 
not "frivolous." The Resolution allows sanctions to be imposed on ·· 
the party who won in the trial court, for "oppo~ing an appeal without 
good faith." ---
1984 CONFERENCE 2-29c-84 
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The matter of sanctions in appellc..te matters should be set in an 
overall scheme established by statute or rule. Th~ Resolution should 
·"e disapproved. 
DELEGATION POmTION: ______________________________________________________ _ 
ASSIGNED 
T~-------------------------------------------------------------
CALLED UP FOR! Limited 
Debate 
-----
Full 
Debate-----
ACTION OF THE 
CONFERENC~----------------------------------------------------
1984 CONFERENCE 2-29d-84 
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CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1987-88 REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 245 
Introduced by Assembly Member Harris 
January 12, 1987 
An act to amend Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, relating to civil actions. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 245, as introduced, Harris. Civil actions: sanctions. 
Existing law authorizes a trial court to require a party, the 
party's attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses 
incurred by another party as a result of tactics or actions not 
based on good faith that are frivolous or solely intended to 
cause unnecessary delay, as specified. 
This bill would revise those provisions by making those 
provisions applicable to tactics or actions not based on good 
faith that are frivolous or that cause unnecessary delay, rather 
than which are solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
1 SECfiON 1. Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil 
2 Procedure is amended to read: 
3 128.5. (a) Every trial court may order a party, the 
4 party's attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses, 
5 including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a 
6 result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or 
7 selely i:MeBEie6: te that cause unnecessary delay. This 
8 section also applies to judicial arbitration proceedings 
9 under Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1141.10) of 
10 Title 3 of Part 3. 
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1 (b) For purposes of this section: 
2 (1) "Actions or tactics" include, but are not limited to, 
3 the making or opposing of motions or the filing and 
4 service of a complaint or cross-complaint. The mere filing 
5 of a complaint without service thereof on an opposing 
6 party does not constitute "actions or tactics" for purposes 
7 of this section. 
8 (2) "Frivolous .. means (A) totally and completely 
9 without merit or (B) for the sole purpose of harassing an 
10 opposing party. 
11 (c) Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be 
12 imposed except on notice contained in a party's moving 
13 or responding papers; or the court's own motion, after 
14 notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing 
15 expenses shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the 
16 conduct or circumstances justifying the order. 
17 (d) The liability imposed by this section is in addition 
18 to any other liability imposed by law for acts or omissions 
19 within the purview of this section. 
0 
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.AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY SEPTEMBER 11, 1987 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLA'IUR.E-1987-88 REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 1252 
Introduced by Assembly Member Zeltner 
March 3, 1987 
An act to reJf)ee:l 8:fttl aEle amend Section 128.5 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, relating to sanctions for frivolous 
litigation. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 1252, as amended, Zeltner. Sanctions for frivolous 
actions. 
Under existing law, a trial court may order a party, the 
party's attorney, or both to pay expenses incurred by another 
party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous 
or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. 
This bill would, iftsteee in addition, provide that in an action 
for personal injury or death a trial court may assess against 
either party or its attorneys sanctions, inelttemg ettemey's 
fees 8:fttl eeft9 in addition to expenses, up to a maximum of 
$10,000, for making frivolous motions, ese:isB:ftg asserting 
frivolous claims, or defenses, or causing unnecessary delays, as 
specified. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
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The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
1 SECfiON 1. It is the intent of the Legislature, in 
2 enacting this act, to impose penalties against plaintiffs 
3 and defendants for making frivolous motions or asserting 
4 frivolous claims or defenses by awarding sanctions ; 
5 Ht:ektamg eests eBEl att:emey's fees; in personal injury or 
6 death actions, in addition to expenses, if a claim or 
7 defense is made in bad faith or without any reasonable 
8 basis in law or fact. 
9 SEC. 2. Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
10 is repealed. 
11 ~ 3: SeeaeB 198:5 is aeaea M the ~ ef Q¥il 
12 Preee&t!re, M Pee&. 
13 ~ -fet 1ft e:,' flOBeft fer perseftal iftjttry er aeatft, 
14 e: trW ee8ft ~ e:s H aeems jttfft; assess agfliftst eitfter 
15 ~ er H9 attemeys sflfteaeBS, Ht:eltMiitlg att:emey' s tees 
16 flft8 eests; till M e: !ftHim1:UB ef tett Ht8ti8flfta ael:lars 
17 ($19,9QQ) , ter male:ftg fftr;eleas meti8ft9, e:ssertiftg 
18 frir;eleas eleims er aereMes, er efltt9iftg HB:fteeessary 
19 eelays. 
20 -tet A frir;elettS IB8B8ft, eleim er eefense, ter the 
21 pl:ll'pese ef Hlis seeaeft, is eB:e !Batie ift -.e Wtft; either ter 
22 Hie pl:ll'p8Se M prele:&ging er eeleyiftg Hie reselatieft et 
23 Hie litigatieft eBEl M harass flftelher party, er ~ !Bflae 
24 -.,.;itheat e:,' reaseBaele 8a:sis ift lew er ift ~ e&Eilael-Eiftg 
25 e:,' ~ &itft &rgHJBeftt fer 8ft efieft8ieft, meameatieft, 
26 er reversal ef eetiftg le¥r. 
27 ~ =Ate ee8ft IBflY assess the 8flfle8eM re!errea M ift 
28 Hlis seetieft either e:t Hie time e fllles eft e: partiettlar 
29 metieft; elaim, er aefeme, er M the time eE jaagmeftt, if 
30 H ftft8s Hle:f Hie efttire ee:se er ae!eftse Htereef we:s 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
fftvelet:tS. 
is amended to read: 
128.5. (a) Every trial court may order a party, the 
party's attorney, or both to pay any reasonable expenses, 
including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a 
result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or 
solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. This section 
also applies to judicial arbitration proceedings under 
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1 Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 1141.10) of Title 
2 3 of Part 3. 
3 (b) In any action for personal injury or death, a trial 
4 court may, as it deems just, assess against either party or 
5 its attorneys sanctions, up to a maximum of ten thousand 
6 dollars ($10,(){X)), in addition to expenses specified in 
7 subdivision (a) and apart from any actual monetary losses 
8 sustained, for making frivolous motions, asserting 
9 frivolous claims or defenses, or causing unnecessary 
10 delays. 
11 (c) For purposes of this section: 
12 (1) "Actions or tactics" include, but are not limited to, 
13 the making or opposing of motions or the filing and 
14 service of a complaint or cross-complaint. The mere filing 
15 of a complaint without service thereof on an opposing 
16 party does not constitute "actions or tactics" for purposes 
17 of this section. 
18 (2) "Frivolous" means '(A) totally and completely 
19 without merit or (B) for the sole purpose of harassing an 
20 opposing party. 
21 (3) A frivolous motion, claim, or defense, for the 
22 purpose of subdivision (b) is one made in bad faith, either 
23 for the purpose of prolonging or delaying the resolution 
24 of the litigation and to harass another party or made 
25 without any reasonable basis in law or in fact and lacking 
26 any good faith argument for an extension, modification, 
27 or reversal of existing law. 
28 (d) The court may assess the sanctions referred to in 
29 subdivision (b) either at the time it rules on a particular 
30 motion, claim, or defense, or at the time of judgment, if 
31 it finds that the entire case or defense thereof was 
32 frivolous. However, sanctions may be assessed only upon 
33 notice contained in a party~ moving papers or on the 
34 court's own motion after notice and an opportunity to be 
35 heard. An order imposing sanctions shall be in writing 
36 and shall recite in detail the conduct or circumstances 
37 justifying the order. 
38 -fet 
39 (e) Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be 
40 imposed except on notice contained in a party's moving 
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1 or responding papers; or the court's own motion, after 
2 notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing 
3 expenses shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the 
4 conduct or circumstances justifying the order. 
5 -tar 
6 (f) The liability imposed by this section is in addition 
7 to any other liability imposed by law for acts or omissions 
8 within the purview of this section. 
0 
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CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1987-88 REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 1252 
Introduced by Assembly Member Zeltner 
March 3, 1987 
An act to repeal and add Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, relating to sanctions for frivolous litigation. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 1252, as introduced, Zeltner. Sanctions for frivolous 
actions. 
Under existing law, a trial court may order a party, the 
party's attorney, or both to pay expenses incurred by another 
party as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous 
or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. 
This bill would, instead, provide that in an action for 
personal injury or death a trial court may assess against either 
party or its attorneys sanctions, including attorney's fees and 
costs, up to a maximum of $10,000, for making frivolous 
motions, assisting frivolous claims, or defenses, or causing 
unnecessary delays, as specified. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
1 SECTION 1. It is the intent of the Legislature, in 
2 enacting this act, to impose penalties against plaintiffs 
3 and defendants for making frivolous motions or asserting 
4 frivolous claims or defenses by awarding sanctions, 
5 including costs and attorney's fees, if a claim or defense 
6 is made in bad faith or without any reasonable basis in law 
7 or fact. 
8 SEC. 2. Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
99 60 
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1 is repealed. 
2 ~ W 'Eve¥)' ffiftl eettff ffi'ftY ~ ft party, Mle 
3 party's attoFney, et' ~ -te pay 8:ftY reasonaQle expenses, 
4 including attonwy's fees; incurred ey another~ as a 
5 rest:Ilt of eae/fa#ft actions et' tactics ~ ftfe fpivolous et' 
6 solely i:ntesded -te eau.9C usnecessaYy delay. =Ffti:s section 
7 £tlse applies -te judicial arhitYation proceedings tiHder 
8 Chapter M (eommeHeiag wHh SectioH HU.lO) of +#le 
9 g ef Paft &.-
10 fBt ~purposes of~ sectioft: 
11 fB- "Actioss et' tactics" iHdude, ~ ftfe ~limited -te; 
12 Mte makiHg et' opposisg of motions et' Mte ftl.ing and 
13 seFvice of a complaiHt et' eresslcomplaist. =Ate me¥e flltng 
14 of a complaint without service thereof en an opposisg 
15 ~ 6-ees fief constitute "aetioss et' tactics" for puFposes 
16 of~ section. 
17 ~ "Frivolous" means W totallry· and completely 
18 without ffiCf'# et' -fBi- for Mte sele purpose of haFassing an 
19 opposing party. 
20 w Expenses pursuant -te ~ seetioR shttil ~ eo 
21 imposed except en notice coHtaise€1 ffi a party's moving 
22 et' resposdiag papers, et' Mte court's ewn motion, ~ 
23 notiee and opportunit)' -te eo heard. An ~ imposing 
24 expenses S:ft.alt eo ffi Wf'itisg and shttif recite ffi detail Mle 
25 coftduct et' circumstances justifying Mte oYdeF. 
26 ~ =Ate l-iabil-ity imposed ey ~ secaon is ffi addition 
27 -te tffiY ~ liability imposed ey law for ~ et' omissions 
28 witftis Mte purview of ~ section. 
29 SEC. 3. Section 128.5 is added to the Code of Civil 
30 Procedure, to read: 
31 128.5. (a) In any action for personal injury or death, 
32 a trial court may, as it deems just, assess against either 
33 party or its attorneys sanctions, including attorney's fees 
34 and costs, up to a maximum of ten thousand dollars 
35 ($10,000), for making frivolous motions, asserting 
36 frivolous claims or defenses, or causing unnecessary 
37 delays. . 
38 (h) A frivolous motion, claim or defense, for the 
39 purpose of this section, is one made in bad faith, either for 
40 the purpose of prolonging or delaying the resolution of 
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1 the litigation and to harass another party, or (2) made 
2 without any reasonable basis in law or in fact and lacking 
3 any good faith argument for an extension, modification, 
4 or reversal of existing law. 
5 (c) The court may assess the sanctions referred to in 
6 this section either at the time it rules on a particular 
7 motion, claim, or defense, or at the time of judgment, if 
8 it finds that the entire case or defense thereof was 
9 frivolous. 
0 
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Executive Director 
CALIFORNIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION 
Fox Plaza, Suite 208 • 1390 Market Street • San Francisco, California 94102 
April 20, 1987 
Hon. Elihu Harris, Chairman 
Assembly Judiciary Committee 
State Capitol, Room 6005 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
RE: AB 1252 (Zeltner) 
Dear Assemblyman Harris: 
(415) 552-7660 
I am writing on behalf of the California Judges Association to 
express our opposition to AB 1252, which authorizes sanctions 
for frivolous motions, but only in wrongful death and personal 
injury cases. It is unfortunate that this bill repeals CCP 
§128.5 which the judges find to be a sound and useful provision 
for control of delaying tactics. 
If we can be of assistance with the problems addressed by this 
bill, please feel free to consult with our Civil Law and 
Procedure Committee Chairman, Judge Roger K. ~Jarren, Sacramento 
Superior Court, (916) 440-7848. 
Thank you for the opportunity to express our concerns. 
Sincerely, 
Constance E. Dove 
Executive Director 
c: Hon. Roger K. Warren 
Hon. Elwood Lui 
Loren V. Smith (0-II) 
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LOS ANGELES COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGES' ASSOCIATION 
legislation Committee 
BRIAN D. CRAHAN 
Chairman 
110 North Grand Avenue 
Los Angeles, California 90012 
April 6, 1987 
Honorable Elihu Harris, Chair 
Assembly Judiciary Committee 
State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Assembly Member Harris: 
Re: AB 1252 (Zeltner) 
The Los Angeles County Municipal Court Judges' Association 
opposes AB 1252, which would authorize the imposition of up to 
$10,000 in attorneys' fees and costs upon a party or attorney 
making a frivolous motion or causing an unnecessary delay in an 
action for personal injury or wrongful death. 
We object to the deletion of the present provisions of Code of 
Civil Procedure §128.5 which we believe to be a useful and 
adequate safeguard against frivolous tactics, and we further 
oppose the limitation of sanctions to certain categories of 
&ctions in this bill. 
BDC:AMS/jw 
cc: Honorable Paul Zeltner 
Ruben Lopez 
Committee Consultant 
Sin~erely, 
\ 
BRI~. CRAIIAN 
Judge, Municipal Court 
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' I THE STATE BAR 
OF CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS lNntor, MARK T HARRIS 
!lOO ELE\·E:-;TH STREET, SL'ITE 315, SACRAME'\1D, CALIFORNIA 9)814 
June 25, 1987 
The Honorable Paul E. Zeltner 
Assembly Member. 54th District 
State Capitol, Room 5130 
Sacramento. CA 95814 
Dear 
fir= 0 AB 1252 
As&'~mber Zeltner: 
Position: Oppose Unless Amended 
The State Bar Family Law Section, composed of experts in the 
field of family law, has reviewed your measure and taken the 
position noted above. Their comments are detailed in the 
enclosed report. 
(910) 444-2762 
THIS POSITION IS BEING PRESENTED ONLY ON BEHALF OF THE FAMILY LAW 
SECTION OF THE STATE BAR AND BAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD 
OF GOVERNORS OR THE MEMBERS OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA. AND 
SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS REPRESENTING THE POSITION OF THE STATE 
BAR OF CALIFORNIA. MEMBERSHIP IN THE FAMILY LAW SECTION OF THE 
STATE BAR IS VOLUNTARY. THE SECTION IS COMPOSED OF 2. 300 MEMBERS 
FROM AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA. 
It is the policy of the State Bar to refer legislative proposals 
affecting specific legal questions or the practice of law to the 
appropriate State Bar Committee or Section for review and com-
ment. Our legislative activity is aimed at bringing the exper-
tise of California's lawyers to the assistance of the people of 
the state through the legislative process. Legislative efforts 
are focused upon the advancement and improvement of law, the 
legal system, and the administration of justice. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me for further information on 
this position. We would welcome the opportunity to meet with you 
or your staff on this issue. 
JAH: j 
Enclosure 
cc: Deborah DeBow, Consultant 
Assembly Judiciary Committee 
.... 
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Clau 
FAMILY LAW SECTION 
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 
E..c~ttiu COMtruJlu 
IRA H Ll'R\'EY, LAs A•f<l<> 
Vut·Ciu.n 
MARGARET L ANDERSON. P.l41u""' 
ROBERT J fRIEDMAN. Los A•l''" 
DANIEL B HUNTER. s,, D>tgo 
STEPHEN A KALEMKARIAN, Fm"' 
IRA H LUR\'EY, Los A•g<ln 
MARGARET L. ANDERSON, !'.14/u.,. 
Smoru,ry I fftt1Jl.(ff'l 
STEPHEN A KALEMKARIAN, Frnno 
Adi.!UCT 
PAMELA E PIERSON. S.n F'"""'" 
LAWRENCE A MOSKOWITZ. s..,. Rruc 
MARTIN C. PACHTER. J..., A-.gd" 
JOHN REPLOGLE. R,,,.,,d, 
St.u &r SUJff AiM1111Uhaicr 
DONALD W. BREER 
RICHARD SHERMAS. imt<<t> 
CHARLES H. SOLEY, F>tm 
555 FRANKLIN STREET 
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102-4498 
{415) 561-8200 
TO: Judith Harper, Office of the Legislative Representative 
FROM: Lynne Yates-Carter, Legislative Coordinator 
DATE: June 15, 1987 
RE: AB 1252 (Zeltner) as introduced 3/3/87. 
COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION: Oppose unless amended. Priority II. 
ANALYSIS : 
LOWELL H SUCHERMAN. San Fm•wco 
ANDREW G WAGNER. S.n lhtgc 
LINDA N WISOTSKY. Bnnl, Hd,. 
LYNNE YATES-CARTER. Sanjou 
JUN 1 S 1987 
This bill would amend California Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5, 
which deals with the court's ability to impose attorneys fees and costs for 
non-meritorious actions in several important respects. 
The bill would: 
1) Provide that CCP 128.5 sanctions only apply to personal injury 
and wrongful death actions; 
2) Set a cap on the award of $10,000; 
3) Redefine what constitutes frivolous or bad faith actions; 
4) Specifically provide that the court could assess sanctions at 
the time it rules on a partciular motion, claim or defense or at the end of the 
entire proceedings. 
The Family Law Section Executive Committee opposes this bill unless it is 
amended to remove the limitation to personal injury and wrongful death actions and 
the $10,000 cap on the award. Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 has been used 
in family law cases as an additional remedy for parties in family law litigation 
who have been faced with bad faith, non-meritorious actions. The appellate court 
has upheld an award in a family law case in excess of $10,000. The committee felt 
that the arbitrary $10,000 cap was inappropriate. However, the committee did 
approve of the re-drafting of the provisions on what would constitute a basis for 
a motion under this section. Since AB 245 (Harris) also would modify this 
section, the committee felt it would be helpful if the changes contemplated by 
both bills were incorporated in one measure. 
PURVIEW : 
The Family Law Section has been charged with promoting the efficient 
administration of justice. This bill, which would eliminate one tool presently 
available to family law practitioners in limiting frivolous actions and tactics in 
family law proceedings, would directly impact on the efficient administration of 
family law matters and thus falls within the committee's purview. 
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JUDITH HARPER 
AE 1252 
PUBLIC POLICY : 
The public policy of this state supports the efficient administration of 
the courts and promoting the use, but not abuse, of the courtroom. In limiting 
the use of Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 to personal injury and wrongful 
death actions and setting a ceiling on the allowable fees and costs, this bill 
would limit the availability of a potent weapon against frivolous proceedings and 
claims. The Family Law Section Executive Committee believes that in its present 
form, this bill is against the best interests of the public and would therefore 
oppose the bill unless it is amended. 
cc: Ira Lurvey 
David Long 
Dennis Cornell 
Don Breer 
~y;_zr~/--
LYNN( YATES-CARTER 
Legislative Coordinator 
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1987-88 REGULAR SESSION 
ASSEMBLY BILL No. 1914 
Introduced by Assembly Member Harris 
March 5, 1987 
An act to add Section 447 to the Code of Civil Procedure, 
relating to civil actions. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
AB 1914, as introduced, Harris. Civil law: frivolous actions. 
Existing law requires every pleading to be subscribed by 
the party or the party's attorney. Existing law authorizes a 
trial court to impose sanctions for bad faith actions or tactics. 
This bill would provide that the signature of an attorney or 
party is a certificate that he or she has read the pleading, 
motion, or other paper, that it is well grounded in fact and 
warranted by law, as specified, and not made for an improper 
purpose. The bill would require an unsigned pleading, 
motion, or other paper to be signed, and to be stricken if not 
signed promptly. The bill would authorize the imposition of 
sanctions if a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in 
violation of the requirements of the bill. 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: no. 
State-mandated local program: no. 
The people of the State of California do enact as follows: 
1 SECTION 1. Section 447 is added to the Code of Civil 
2 Procedure, to read: 
3 447. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes 
4 a certificate by him or her that he or she has read the 
5 pleading, motion, or other paper, that to the best of his 
6 or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after 
7 reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is 
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1 warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
2 the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, 
3 and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, 
4 such as to harass or cause unnecessay delay or needless 
5 increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or 
6 other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is 
7 signed promptly after the omission is called to the 
8 attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, 
9 or other paper is signed in violation of this section, the 
10 court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall 
11 impose upon the person who signed it, a represented 
12 party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
13 include an order to pay the other party or parties the 
14 amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 
15 the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, 
16 including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
0 
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AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY SEPTEMBER 2, 1987 
AMENDED IN ASSEMBLY AUGUST 17, 1987 
AMENDED IN SENATE MAY 28,1987 
AMENDED IN SENATE MAY 14,1987 
AMENDED IN SENATE APRIL 23, 1987 
AMENDED IN SENATE MARCH 16, 1987 
SENATE BILL No. 379 
Introduced by Senator Presley 
February 12, 1987 
An act to add and repeal Sections 447 and 1021.1 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, relating to civil actions. 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST 
SB 379, as amended, Presley. Civil actions. 
(1) Existing law authorizes the court to order a party, the 
party's attorney, or both, to pay reasonable expenses, 
including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as the 
result of bad faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely 
intended to cause unnecessary delay. 
This bill would provide that the signature of an attorney or 
party constitutes a certificate that the person has read the 
pleading, motion, or paper, and that it is well grounded and 
not interposed for an improper purpose. It would provide that 
if the paper is not signed it shall be stricken if not promptly 
signed. If a pleading is signed in violation of the above 
provisions, the court would, upon motion or its own initiative 
and after an opportunity to be heard, impose sanctions. 
(2) Under existing law, in the absence of some special 
circumstance, such as a contractual agreement or specific 
statutory provision to the contrary, each party to a legal 
- 85 - 93 40 
SB 379 2-
dispute is to bear the fees. 
There are numerous on specific 
substantive issues which to award 
attorney's fees to one party the expense of another party. 
This bill would provide that a party makes a specified 
settlement offer that is accepted and the party not 
accepting the offer fails to obtain a more favorable offer, the 
party making the offer could, in the courf s discretion, be 
awarded reasonable attorney's fees for services after the date 
of the offer, as specified. 
(3) The bill would apply only in Riverside and San 
Bernardino Counties; ftftEl ·.vould authori~e ~ hoMes et 
superYisors et ffto.se counties .ffi require ~ presiding juage et 
#te superior eeufi te Fepor"t te #te Legislature, as specifieS. It 
would require the Judicial Council to assess the impact of the 
bill upon court congestion, as and to report to the 
Legislature on or before 1, 199L 
( 4) The provisions other than those relating to 
the Judicial Council would until January 1, 
.J:.99a 1991, when # they would 
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. committee: ft& 
yes. State-mandated local program: no. 
The people of the State enact as follows: 
1 SECTION 1. 447 is Code of Civil 
2 Procedure, to read: 
3 447. (a) The signature an 
4 constitutes a ..-.~·~h~-'"" 
5 read the pleading, 
6 of his or her 
7 after reasonable 
8 warranted by 
9 the extension, LU\JUJ: .. U"-'""U'-''- ... 
10 and that it is not 
11 such as to harass or cause unne1ces;sa:r 
12 increase in the cost of 
13 other paper is not 
14 signed promptly is called to the 
15 attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, 
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I or other paper is signed violation of this section, the 
2 court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall 
3 impose upon the person who signed it, a represented 
4 party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may 
5 include an order to pay the other party or parties the 
6 amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 
7 the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, 
8 including a reasonable attorney's fee. Sanctions may be 
9 imposed only after notice and opportunity to be heard. 
10 An order imposing sanctions shall be in writing, and shall 
11 recite in detail the circumstances justifying sanctions. 
12 (b) This section shall apply only in Riverside County 
13 and San Bernardino County. The Legislature finds and 
14 declares that, in order to assess the impact of this section 
15 on a limited basis before making it applicable on a 
16 statewide basis, it is necessary for this section to be 
17 applicable for a limited period of time in those counties. 
18 (c) This section shall remain in effect until January 1, 
19 ±9W 1991, and on that date is repealed, unless a later 
20 enacted statute, which becomes effective on or before 
21 January 1, ±9W 1991, deletes or extends that date. 
22 SEC. 2. Section 1021.1 is added to the Code of Civil 
23 Procedure, to read: 
24 1021.1. (a) Reasonable attorney's fees, may be 
25 awarded in an amount to be determined in the court's 
26 discretion, to a party to any civil action as provided by this 
27 section, and that award shall be made upon notice and 
28 motion by a party and shall be an element of the costs of 
29 suit. 
30 (b) A party may be entitled, in the discretion of the 
31 court, to an award of attorney's fees under this section if 
32 all of the following conditions are met: 
33 ( 1) The party has made an offer for judgment under 
34 Section 998. 
35 (2) That offer was not accepted within the time 
36 provided in Section 998. 
37 (3) The party to whom the offer was made thereafter 
38 failed to obtain a more favorable judgment. 
39 The party making the offer shall be entitled to 
40 attorney's fees only for legal services rendered after the 
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1 date of the 
2 (c) In to award attorney's fees 
3 the court shall the following factors: 
4 (1) The reasonableness or lack thereof, of a party's 
5 failure to accept an for judgment under Section 998 
6 in light of the facts known to the party at the time, of 
7 which, in light of of the circumstances, should have 
8 been known to the party. Reasonableness shall be 
9 determined by a consideration of at least the following 
10 matters: 
11 (A) The then merit or lack of merit in the 
12 claim that was subject of the action. 
13 (B) The closeness of the questions of fact and law at 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
issue. 
(C) Whether offeror has unreasonably refused to 
furnish information necessary to evaluate the 
reasonableness the offer. 
(D) Whether the action was in the nature of a "test 
case," presenting questions far-reaching importance 
affecting nonparties. 
(E) The relief might reasonably have been 
expected if the should prevail. 
(F) The amount the additional delay, cost, and 
expense that the reasonably would be expected to 
incur if the litigation should be prolonged. 
(G) Those other matters that the court may deem 
relevant in the of justice. 
(2) The damages and other relief sought 
and the results the client. 
(3) The by the parties or the attorneys to 
settle the controversy. 
(4) The .::::.vic•+-""" 
procedure by 
(d) In exerciS:ing 
amount of at"t-nrrt""'\7 
consider the follo\\ing except that in no event 
shall the amount awarded exceed a reasonable fee for the 
services actually 
( 1) Customary community in which the 
action or proceeding pending charged by attorneys 
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1 with similar experience or expertise. 
2 (2) The time and labor reasonably required to be 
3 spent by the attorney or attorneys. 
4 (3) The experience and ability of the attorneys 
5 generally within the profession and also with respect to 
6 the action or proceeding. 
7 (4) The novelty and difficulty of the questions 
8 involved and the skill required to perform the services 
9 properly. 
10 (5) The extent to which the acceptance of the 
11 particular matter imposes extraordinary burdens on the 
12 attorney or attorneys (A) by way of precluding other 
13 employment, (B) by the time limitations imposed by the 
14 client, or (C) by the circumstances. 
15 (6) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
16 (7) Those other factors that the court may deem 
17 relevant in the interest of justice, including any of the 
18 factors described in subdivision (c). 
19 (e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to repeal 
20 or modify any other statutory provision for the award of 
21 attorney's fees or to diminish any express or implied 
22 contractual right which a party to a civil action may 
23 otherwise have to obtain an award of attorney's fees for 
24 the prosecution or defense of an action. 
25 (f) No attorney's fees shall be awarded pursuant to this 
26 section in any of the following instances: 
27 ( 1) Against a party who is proceeding in forma 
28 pauperis or a party whom the court has found not to have 
29 the financial ability to pay fees or who would suffer an 
30 unreasonable financial hardship if ordered to pay fees. 
31 (2) For or against any party with respect to any cause 
32 of action under which an award for reasonable attorney's 
33 fees is authorized or required by any other federal or 
34 California statute. 
35 (3) For or against any party with respect to any cause 
36 of action or proceeding commenced or prosecuted under 
37 the provisions of Title 7 (commencing with Section 
38 1230.010) of Part 3. 
39 ( 4) For or against any party in any action in which one 
40 or more of plaintiffs seek to proceed as a class under 
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1 Section 382. 
2 (5) For or against as to any cause of action 
3 the gravamen of is personal injury M wroBgful 
4 death, wrongful death, or injunctive relief. 
5 (g) The determination under this section shall be 
6 made after the final disposition of the action. 
7 (h) This section shall apply only in Riverside County 
8 and San Bernardino County. The Legislature finds and 
9 declares that, in order to assess the impact of this section 
10 on a limited basis before making it applicable on a 
11 statewide basis, it is necessary for this section to be 
12 applicable for a limited period of time in those counties. 
13 -fit +he Board of 8uperYisors of Riverside CotHl:ty M 
14 8afl BeFnardiflo CouBty, respectively, m.-ay require ~ 
15 presidiBg judge of ~ superior eetH"t ffi periodieatly 
16 report ffi .tfte JudieiaFy Com:IBittees of ~ Assem:bly ftftEl 
17 ffi ~ 8eBate ftftEl ffi .tfte Speaker of.~ Assem:bly ftftEl f6 
18 .tfte Prestdent pre Tem:pere of .tfte 8e:aate ttS ffi ~ 
19 impact, # a:ay; of tffis section eft ftftY M aH of .tfte folle·Niftg. 
20 +±+ bft5e filings. 
21 -fQt Reductien of ~ ~ ame of ~ te 
22 settlem:ent M triab 
23 f3t Yse of effers fo'f' judgmeflt uBdeF 8ectien 99& 
24 -f4t +he numbeF of dispesitiens ey settleffteftt. 
25 -tft 
26 (i) This section shall remain in effect until January 1, 
27 ~ 1991, and on that date is repealed, unless a later 
28 enacted statute, which becomes effective on or before 
29 January l, ~ 1991, or extends that date. 
30 SEC. 3. (a) It is the purpose of this act to reduce 
31 court congestion. It is the further purpose of adding 
32 Section 447 to the Civil Procedure to determine 
33 whether that section will result in pleadings that are 
34 accurate, based upon a reasonable investigation, and are 
35 not frivolous. For courts in Riverside County and San 
36 Bernardino County the effectiveness of this act shall be 
37 determined by whether, and to what extent, this act 
38 accomplishes the following goals: 
39 ( 1) Reduces caseload by 20 percent. 
40 (2) Reduces frivolous actions by 20 percent. 
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1 (3) Increases the early settlement of cases by 20 
2 percent. 
3 (b) The Judicial Council shall assess the impact of this 
4 act upon the courts to which it applies, and shall report 
5 its findings to the Legislature on or before January 1, 1991. 
6 The assessment and report shall include a determination 
7 of the number of filings in affected courts, the number of 
8 issues involving verification of pleadings that were raised, 
9 whether those issues required a court hearing, the 
10 number of cases in which sanctions were requested 
11 under Section 447 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and 
12 whether the judges believe that Section 447 of the Code 
13 of Civil Procedure contributes to a reduction of 
14 unfounded civil litigation. The report shall particularly 
15 address whether this act has accomplished the goals set 
16 forth in subdivision (a). 
17 (c) The presiding judges of the courts in which this act 
18 applies shall cooperate with the Judicial Council in the 
19 assessment and report required by this section. 
0 
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Date of Hearing: August 19, 1987 
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY 
ELIHU M. HARRIS. Chairman 
SB 379 (Presley) -As Amended: August 17, 1987 
PRIOR ACTION 
Sen. Com. on JUD. 6-4 Sen. Floor 23-3 
SB 379 
SUBJECT: This bill establishes a pilot project in two counties which will 
requ1re (1) certification of pleadings and other papers as well grounded and 
(2) provide for attorneys' fee shifting under specified circumstances. 
DIGEST 
This bill provides for a limited duration pilot project in Riverside and San 
Bernardino Counties. Specifically it provides that, in those counties, until 
January 1, 1993: 
1) The signature of an attorney or party on a pleading, motion or other paper 
certifies that: 
a) The person has read the paper. 
b) He or she knows or believes it is well grounded in fact and warranted 
either by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification or reversal thereof and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose such as delay, harassment or needlessly increasing 
litigation costs. If the paper is not signed, it shall be stricken 
unless promptly signed after the omission is called to the pleader or 
movant's attention. If the paper is signed in violation of the 
requirements of the bill, the court shall impose an appropriate 
sanction upon the party and/or the signer. The sanction may include 
an order to pay expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by other 
parties because of the filing of the paper. 
2) Reasonable attorneys' fees may be awarded to a party in a civil action if 
he or she has made an offer of compromise under Civil Procedure Code 
Section 998 which was not timely accepted and the rejecting party fails to 
obtain a more favorable judgment. Fees may be awarded only for legal 
services rendered after the date of the offer. In relation to this 
provision, the bill further provides that: 
a) In deciding whether to award fees, the court shall consider: 
- continued -
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i) The reasonableness of the failure to accept the Section 998 offer. 
ii) The amount of damages sought and the results contained. 
iii) The efforts made by the parties or the attorneys to settle the 
controversy. 
iv) The existence of any bad faith or abuse of legal procedure by the 
parties or the attorneys. 
b) The amount of the award shall be in the court's discretion, subject to 
considerations of the following factors: 
i) Customary fees charged by similarly experienced attorneys in the 
community. 
ii) The time and labor reasonably required as well as the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved and the skill required. 
iii) The experience and ability of the attorneys as well as the extent 
to which acceptance of the particular matter imposes extraordinary 
burdens on the attorneys. 
iv) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
c) A fee award is excluded: 
i) Against an indigent party or a party who does not have the ability 
to pay. 
ii) For or against a party if an award is authorized by any other 
statute. 
iii) In eminent domain actions. 
iv) In class actions. 
v) In personal injury or wrongful death actions. 
d) It shall not be construed to repeal or modify any other statutory 
attorneys' fee award provision or to diminish any contractual right 
which a party may otherwise have to obtain an award of attorney's 
fees. 
- continued -
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e) The respective County Boards of Supervisors may require the presiding judges to report to the Legislature as to the impact on case filings, 
delay reduction, Section 998 offers, and settlements. 
FISCAL EFFECT 
None 
COMMENTS 
1) The California Council of Land Surveyors and Engineers (Council) is the 
source of this bill's requirement that an attorney or party must certify 
that a pleading, motion or paper is well grounded and not interposed for a 
improper purpose. According to the Council, that provision is 
substantially similar to Federal Rule 11, except it has been modified to 
conform to existing California requirements for verification of pleadings. 
The Council further states that the purpose and intent of the rule is "to 
insure that allegations are supported by sufficient factual information 
such that the claims asserted are not frivolous." 
2) The California Supreme Court held in In re Marriage of Flaherth (1982) 31 
Cal.3d 637 that "Fundamental constitutional mandates require tat the 
basic protections of due process be followed before an attorney is fined 
for prosecuting a frivolous appeal." The court further stated that 
"Penalties for prosecuting frivolous appeals should not be imposed without 
giving fair warning, affording the attorney an opportunity to respond to 
the charge, and holding a hearing. Further, when imposing sanctions, the 
court should provide the attorney with a written statement of the reasons 
for the penalty." 
Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 which authorizes the imposition of 
sanctions for frivolous or delaying bad-faith actions or tactics provides 
that "Expenses pursuant to this section shall not be imposed except on 
notice contained in a party's moving or responding papers; or the court's 
own motion, after notice and opportunity to be heard. An order imposing 
expenses shall be in writing and shall recite in detail the conduct or 
circumstances justifying the order." 
In order to conform to the requirements of Flahertt, should not this bill 
be amended to provide due process protections simi ar to those contained 
in Section 128.5? 
3) The California Legal Reform Project (CLRP) is the source of this bill's 
fee shifting provisions. CLRP states that those provisions have been 
- continued -
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carefully crafted to "confine judicial discretion through criteria of 
reasonableness of the offer and the fees and (to) prohibit an award of 
fees against a person as to whom such an award would represent a financial 
hardship." CLRP further states its belief that the bill "will produce 
meaningful data to guide us in future actions to improve the civil justice 
system ... 
In support of this measure, the Attorney General's office states that 
"Because frivolous or weak claims are becoming a substantial problem in 
our courts, we believe that SB 379 is a reasonable approach to at least 
assuring that settlement offers made under Code of Civil Procedure section 
998 are seriously made and seriously considered by the parties in civil 
actions. Hopefully, this bill will help mitigate the court congestion 
that most California counties are now experiencing." 
4) The Alliance of American Insurers and the California State Automobile 
Association (CSAA) oppose this bill. CSAA states that the bill would 
allow plaintiffs an unfair "leverage" in many cases because a defendant 
often does not know litigation is pending "until he is served and thus, 
may need to conduct extensive and often lengthy investigation and 
discovery before he can respond to, or make an offer. 11 CSAA therefore 
states its concern that this bill would enable a plaintiff to force the 
defendant to pay plaintiff's attorney's fees simply by making an offer to 
settle before the defendant has had a chance to evaluate the case. CSAA 
also argues that the bill places insurance carriers "in a virtual no-win 
situation because a losing plaintiff is often judgment proof or has no 
assets with which to pay defendant's attorney's fees." 
5) The Access to Justice Foundation (AJF) opposes this bill. Along with 
Common Cause (CC), AJF has suggested that the bill be amended to provide 
that its fee shifting provisions apply only to cases "that seek money 
damages at law only." CC points out that various provisions of law allow 
for injunctive relief and other equitable remedies and that in some cases 
the plaintiff may be "acting as a kind of class representative. He/she 
may file an action and may be seeking restitution (or) collaterally minor 
money damages in order to right a larger wrong." 
CC further states that it is in society's interest, once such an action is 
brought, to allow the litigants to pursue it, particularly where others 
forego action awaiting injunctive result. CC argues that if a small 
restitution amount may also be involved, it 1s possible for an egregious 
defendant to 11 buy out the case" by offering that restitutionary amount of 
money to the plaintiff. It is argued that vulnerability to a large fee 
award may effectively "require" a plaintiff to accept the offer and end 
the case, thereby "forfeiting the injunctive benefits for .•• society as a 
whole." 
- continued -
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6) The American Civil Liberties Union opposes this bill. The ACLU argues 
that the fee-shifting provisions "may force a party to accept a settlement 
offer rather than exercise his or her rights to seek a full trial and 
award of damages based on the merits of the case." The ACLU further 
questions "the propriety of limiting the right to access courts for the 
residents of (the two specified counties). We also question whether a 
study of the effectiveness of this proposal would be of any significance 
if the areas to which it applies are not representative of the varieties 
of civil court jurisdictions throughout the state." 
7) This bill is a two-county, five-year pilot project which authorizes the 
Boards of Supervisors of the affected counties to require the presiding judges to report to the Legislature regarding the impact of the 
fee-shifting provisions. Is not the Judicial Council the most appropriate 
entity to survey and report on any such impact? Should not the bill 
provide for a report on both of the projects which it establishes (i.e., 
the sanctions for improper-certification as well as the fee shifting 
provisions)? 
SUPPORT 
California Judges Association 
Attorney General, State of 
California 
County Supervisors Association of 
California 
Association of California Water 
Agencies 
Los Angles County Superior Court 
R. LeBov 
4~5-4560 
ajud 
OPPOSITION 
American Civil Liberties Union 
Access to Justice Foundation 
California State Automobile Association 
Alliance of American Insurers 
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RESOLUTION 4-11-87 
DIGEST 
( Signatures on Pleadings: Certification of Compliance Amends Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 to state that the signature on a pleading 
certifies that the pleading satisfies the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. 
RESOLUTIONS COMMITTEE REPORT 
Recommend DISAPPROVE 
History: 
Similar to 1986 Resolution 4-10, which was disapproved. Identical to AB 1984 
(Harris) and SB 379 (Presley), except that these bills would add section 447 to the 
Code of Civil Procedure instead of amending Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. 
Reasons: 
This resolution makes the signature on a pleading a certification that the signing 
party has read the pleading, that it is not interposed as a bad faith action, that it is 
not frivolous, and that it is not intended to cause unnecessary delay. The resolution 
adopts a requirement for California consistent with Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 11, ignoring the fact that section 128.5, subdivision (a) already 
accomplishes this end. The resolution is, therefore, redundant. Additionally, insofar 
as this resolution is directed at attorneys, its purpose is served by Rule 6-lOl(A) of 
the rules of Professional Conduct and is thus unnecessary. 
• • • • • • • • • • • * * * • • • * * • * • • • • • • • • • • • • • • * • • 
SECTION/COMMITTEE REPORTS 
COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
Recommend DISAPPROVE 
Reasons: 
The Committee on the Administration of Justice does not condone bad faith or frivilous 
pleadings. However, this proposal will not add to already existing California law designed to 
discourage such pleading practices. If such a change were enacted, it should be placed in Code 
of Civil Procedure section 446, which obligates a party to sign pleadings, not in section 128.5 
which does not directly deal with pleadings. 
TEXT OF RESOLUTION 
RESOLVED that the Conference of Delegates recommends that legis-
lation be sponsored to amend California Code of Civil Procedure 
Section 128.5 to read as follows: 
1 Section 128.5 
2 (a) Every trial court may order a party, the party's attorney, 
3 or both to pay any reasonable expenses, including attorney's 
4 fees, incurred by another party as a result of bad-faith 
5 actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to 
6 cause unnecessary delay. This section also applies to judicial 
7 arbitration proceedings under Chapter 2.5 (commencing with 
8 Section 1141.10) of Title 3 of Part 3. ,l(b) The signature of 
9 an attorney 2£ party on ~ complaint, motion ££ any other 
10 pleading constitutes a certificate that he 2£ she has read the 
11 pleading and that, to the best of his or her knowledge, 
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12 information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is 
13 not interposed ~ ~ bad faith action 2£ tactic and that it is 
14 not frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. 
15 fb+ ..W.. For purposes of this section: ,, (1) "Actions or 
16 tactics" include, but are not limited to, the making or opposing 
17 of motions or the filing and service of a complaint or cross-
18 complaint. The mere filing of a complaint without service 
19 thereof on an opposing party does not constitute "actions or 
20 tactics" for purposes of this section. ,1(2) "Frivolous" means 
21 (A) totally and completely without merit or (B) for the sole 
22 purpose of harassing an opposing party. tfe+ (d) Expenses 
23 pursuant to this section shall not be imposed except on notice 
24 contained in a party's moving or responding papers: or the 
25 court's own motion, after notice and opportunity to be heard. 
26 An order imposing expenses shall be in writing and shall recite 
27 in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order. 
28 fd+ ~ The liability imposed by this section is in addition 
29 to any other liability imposed by law for acts or omissions 
30 within the purview of this section. 
(Proposed new language underlined; language to be deleted stricken) 
PROPONENT: The Bar Association of San Francisco 
STATEMENT OF REASONS: 
Section 128.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure was amended by the 
Legislature during its 1985-86 Regular Session (Ch. 297, 5B 296) 
to provide that "bad faith actions" and tactics which are "solely 
intended to cause unnecessary delay" can be the basis for sanctions 
at the discretion of the Court. This resolution would add a new 
subsection (b) to Section 128.5 to clarify that the signature 
of an attorney or party on a complaint, motion or other pleading 
is a certification that a reasonable inquiry into the facts and 
law on which the pleading is based has been made, and that it 
is neither frivolous nor interposed for any of the improper pur-
poses outlined in Section 128.5. While the resolution would 
emphasize to attorneys and parties that the signing of a complaint, 
motion or other pleading is a serious and meaningful act requiring 
some forethought, it does not expand the scope of conduct which 
is sanctionable under Section 128.5. 
This proposed change in Section 128.5 would not affect any other 
statute, law, or court rule. 
AUTHOR AND/OR PERMANENT CONTACT: James W. Morando (415) 954-4457 
and Betsy Jolley (415) 392-6320. 
RESPONSIBLE FLOOR DELEGATES: James W. Morando (415) 954-4457 
and Betsy Jolley (415) 392-6320. 
- 98 -
4-llb-87 
) 
) 
) 
COUNTER-ARGUMENT TO RESOLUTION 4-11-87 
,. 
( Alameda County Bar Association 
The Alameda County Bar Association urges disapproval of Resolution 
4-11-87 because it feels that the present law adequately takes 
care of situations involving bad faith actions or tactics and 
therefore feels the resolution is unnecessary. 
This resolution seeks to have language inserted in Code of Civil 
Procedures Section 128.5 that, in substance, an attorney or 
party who signs a complaint, motion or other pleading verifies 
that in fact he or she has read the pleading, and that "after 
reasonable inquiry" the pleading is not "interposed as a bad 
faith action or tactic," nor is it "frivolous" or "solely intended 
to cause unnecessary delay." The proposal does not seek to expand 
the current law, but is intended to emphasize to attorneys and 
parties that signature "is a serious and meaningful act requiring 
some forethought . ., Although not indicated in the Statement 
of Reasons, this proposal is patterned after Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 11. 
It is not believed that this proposal would accomplish anything 
of any significance, and in fact, would be a detriment. If the 
proposed language is passed, the focus of inquiry on any hearing 
would, in part, become the nature of the investigation done in 
order to meet the requirement of "after reasonable inquiry." 
Particularly in actions where one side has a great economic power 
over the other side, it is likely to cause greater litigation, 
with the focal point of the litigation being what an attorney 
has done to investigate the facts underlying the pleading. The 
current law provides sufficient guidance for trial courts regarding 
this issue, and no further delineation of the statute is necessary. 
COUNTERARGUMENT TO RESOLUTION 4-ll-87 
ANTELOPE VALLEY BAR ASSOCIATION 
This resolution would reauire an attorney to attest to the merit of any complaint, motion, 
etc., that he or she signs. This is clearly unnecessary because Code of Civil Procedure 
Section 128.5 already covers the area sufficiently. 
COUNTER-ARGUMENT TO RESOLUTION 4-11-87 
San Diego County Bar Association 
The language is surplusage. Parties generally only sign 
verifications or declarations which are under penalty of 
perjury. Attorneys are officers of the Court and are bound by 
the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
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Debate 
------
ACTION OF THE 
Full 
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